In 1960 it was suggested that the word “intelligence” should be banned from the lexicon of the United Nations. Indeed, the UN continues to shy away from official use of the term because of its association with illegal or undercover activities, such as spying, theft, and distortion, with which the UN would not (and should not) be involved. Nevertheless, intelligence, in its pure sense of processed information, both open and secret, relating to security, is an essential part of UN peacekeeping, and is recognized as such by UN staff, both civilian and military. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have sometimes included “information units” or “Military Information Branches” (MIBs) in their structures. Thus, the UN has officially sidestepped the term “intelligence,” though some staff members of these units unofficially called themselves intelligence officers, and many have been drawn from the ranks of various professional military and police intelligence organizations.

Many failures in the history of UN field operations might have been avoided had the UN taken a more forthright approach to intelligence and possessed a stronger mandate to gather information and improve its information-gathering systems. The list includes outbreaks from the distant past, such as the Korean War of 1950 (witnessed but not foreseen by the UN Commission on Korea), and more recent ones, such as the incursion of SWAPO guerrillas into Namibia (1989), the Iraqi attack on

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Kuwait (1990), the renewal of civil war in Angola (1995), and the genocide in Rwanda (1994), all of which occurred in or near areas of United Nations operations. UN Force commander Romeo Dallaire complained of being "deaf and blind" in Rwanda without a substantial intelligence capability. Many UN force commanders, past and present, would echo his remarks.

The UN's information branches and units, both in the field and at UN headquarters, when they are created, are merely small parts of a vast network of international and national bodies engaged in information-gathering and sharing during a peacekeeping operation. While the UN information units are dwarfed by national intelligence bodies, they can gain much useful information using a variety of means to help the UN's mission. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few articles, little attention has been paid to intelligence-gathering peacekeeping.

THE SECRECY DILEMMA

One of the first stumbling blocks that the United Nations encounters in intelligence-gathering is the issue of secrecy. Secret intelligence (i.e., intelligence that cannot be divulged except to specifically authorized individuals or organizations) has been used by the UN regularly, though hesitatingly and inconsistently, over the years. For the UN, a great dilemma arises when the information is gathered secretly, since the world body is officially dedicated to transparency, impartiality, and the rule of law. On the one hand, the UN recognizes that secret information-gathering and handling is often required to achieve its noble ends (e.g., the protection of its forces and the success of its missions); on the other, this sometimes questionable means carries great hazards, even if legal. UN officials have seen that even open, passive information collection, such as taking photos with an unconcealed camera, can raise the hackles of a conflicting party, who might consider it a hostile act and may suspect (wrongly in most cases) that the UN will use it in a way that will hurt its cause. (In the former Yugoslavia, UN peacekeepers have been prohibited from carrying cameras except by special authorization from the force commander.) The UN cannot afford to lose credibility or tarnish its image as an honest broker and impartial mediator by having competing parties accuse it of using covert methods to gather information. Moreover, the UN must seek to maintain high moral and ethical standards. According to an earlier Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, the UN must have "clean hands." The first multidimensional peacekeeping effort,
the UN Operation in the Congo, created by Hammarskjold in 1960 and described in detail here, shows the difficulty and the importance of finding the proper limits for secret information-gathering.

Under certain circumstances, secrecy of information is unarguably essential. A case in point was UN monitoring in Bosnia. Scandinavian soldiers in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) carefully observed the impact of mortar fire from Serb units outside a besieged Muslim town. The peacekeepers immediately reported by radio the locations of the hits to UN force headquarters. But unknown to the peacekeepers, the Serb soldiers were monitoring the UN radio communications and using this information to correct their fire. By sending messages “in the clear,” the UN was inadvertently helping one party to commit aggression. In this case, secrecy of information (through secure communication lines or other methods) was clearly called for.

More generally, the success of a UN PKO may depend on secrecy and intelligence-gathering. This is true for both classical PKOs tasked with monitoring cease-fires and those interposed in a demilitarized zone between opposing forces, where “quiet diplomacy” behind closed doors and quick preemptive (secret) deployment is often the best means to address observed or potential violations. Often, moving peacekeepers into a position desired by one or more conflicting parties is necessary to prevent them from fighting for it. For this kind of rapid and undeclared preventive action, early warning about the actions and intentions of the parties is needed. This involves unobtrusive and keen observation of their troop dispositions. Secret intelligence is even more important in modern multidimensional PKOs with their expanded responsibilities: elections monitoring, where individual votes must be kept secret; arms control verification, including possible surprise inspections at secret locations; law enforcement agency supervision (to “watch the watchmen”); mediation, where confidential bargaining positions that are confidentially shared by one party with the UN should not be revealed to the other; sanctions and border monitoring, where clandestine activities (e.g., arms shipments) must be uncovered or intercepted without allowing smugglers to take evasive action. When forces are operating in hazardous or potentially explosive areas, such as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Somalia, secret intelligence takes on added importance and calls for special skills in intelligence-gathering. For instance, clandestine arms shipments, secret plans for aggression or ethnic cleansing or genocide, and threats to the lives or the mission of the peacekeepers should be uncovered as quickly as possible.
While secrecy can often be justified as essential, there are also many reasons to support openness. Table 1 provides a list of the advantages of openness, as well as the requirements for secrecy. The list shows the complex dilemma the UN (and, indeed, any organization that tries to live up to high ethical standards) faces when it tries to determine the degree of secrecy it will employ. Unfortunately, the UN has not adequately prepared itself to deal with secret intelligence in a systematic fashion. In comparison with nation states and military organizations (such as NATO), little consideration has been given to the matter. The UN does not have guidelines to govern the methods of information-gathering, to determine which material is to be kept secret, at what classification level and with what means, to uphold rules of secrecy or workable procedures for declassification. Often the character of a PKO’s information policy is decided by the commander in the field or by each contingent, or even each individual, differently.

The tension between secrecy and openness, between information ends and means, makes a study of the problem not only interesting academically, but also potentially useful in practice. As background, Table 2 describes the basic components of the “intelligence cycle”: planning, gathering, processing, and disseminating. With each stage, the UN has requirements and limitations that need to be reconciled, as well as secrecy issues to be addressed. This conceptual, staged view of the intelligence process provides a logical manner to study the major issues in detail and examine the balance to be achieved. While the planning stage is important, the major issues are found in the other stages, starting with information-gathering.

INFORMATION-GATHERING

Often the United Nations must engage in information-gathering activities that could be termed “borderline” or in the “grey zone.” What are the limits of this intelligence grey zone, in theory and practice? The balance point is, obviously, dependent on the situation, but some basic principles can be established. The wide spectrum of intelligence-gathering activities is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. On the left are the non-controversial (white) activities and on the right those which are prohibited and generally associated with more secrecy (black). Even in the white area, the UN PKOs must generally have the approval of conflicting parties, or at least that of the host state. These include setting up permanent observation posts, installing sensors, and overflying certain areas for reconnaissance purposes. The black areas are “out of bounds” for the UN, for example, hiring of agents who misrepresent themselves to authorities, theft of
**TABLE 1.** Secrecy versus Openness: the relative advantages of both approaches.

**ADVANTAGES OF OPENNESS**
- More acceptable/desirable morally (expected of the UN)
- Provides a positive example to conflicting parties
- Less threatening ("nothing to hide")
- Reduces suspicions of covert operations
  (including use of the UN as a front or source for foreign intelligence services)
- Less potential for misunderstanding (usually)
- Demonstrates lack of self-interest
- Builds confidence
- Increases knowledge (helps get information into the right hands)
- Permits greater feedback (internal and external)
- Less costly in time and money, personnel and equipment
- Facilitates accountability (proper credit and blame)
- Reduces compartmentalization, builds team spirit

**ADVANTAGES OF SECRECY**
- Better protection of information-gathering sources and methods (especially to prevent loss of them)
- Increases willingness of others (governments, individuals) to share secret information
- Prevents disclosure of embarrassing facts or weaknesses
  (though this may be a disadvantage in terms of accountability)
- May reduce information manipulation or misuse (though sometimes the opposite)
- Provides competitive advantage when several players/parties seek to take action
- Permits selective information exchange/bartering
- Allows better control of timing and amount of information release
  (and permits time for authentication and correction of drafts)

**FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEGREE OF SECRECY WARRANTED**
- The "need to know" (e.g., for success of mission or safety of personnel)
- Political approval of UN member states* (see below)
- Approval (tacit or explicit) of host state and/or parties observed
- Legal implications (violations of national or international laws?)
- Operational considerations (technical and human means of information-gathering)
- Cost in time, money, manpower

*Source: A. Walter Dorn.*

*The following is the order, for better or worse, by which approval is usually sought: P5 (the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, starting with the S1—the only superpower, the US), SC15 (the 15 members of the Security Council), TC20-30 (troop contributing nations to the PKO, whose number may vary) and MS185 (all the UN Member States).*
TABLE 2. Stages in the Intelligence Cycle: planning, gathering, processing (analysis) and dissemination. This table summarizes the purpose, methods, UN limitations, and UN secrecy issues associated with each stage of the revolving, interconnected, and continuous intelligence process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>UN Limitations</th>
<th>UN Secrecy Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Decide on the information needs, the methods, the limits and the limitations of information-gathering and sharing</td>
<td>Identify priority information requirements (PIR), essential sources and key “targets”; use feedback after information-dissemination</td>
<td>Complaints from nations about infringement on sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>Obtain the basic material (“raw data”) for analysis; maintain situational awareness (“keep on top of all the news”); learn background history and views of parties</td>
<td>Obtain information from various sources (open or confidential) such as on-site UN personnel/agencies, governments, regional organizations, the media, NGOs and individuals</td>
<td>Abide by national and international laws; respect for sovereignty; avoid activities that reflect negatively on the UN (e.g., association with intelligence agencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Processing</td>
<td>Develop an understanding of the actors and actions; develop scenarios and make predictions; provide policy options</td>
<td>Corroborate, synthesize and analyze; identify gaps and missing information; requires creative thinking, “brainpower,” and some intuition with lots of background (historical and current) and facts</td>
<td>Avoid partiality, excessive criticism, over- and under-prediction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Dissemination (Intelligence-sharing)</td>
<td>Take action (e.g., early warning, conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution); demonstrate competence in the field and at HQ</td>
<td>Communicate to key persons/groups verbally or in writing (electronic or paper form); unicast, broadcast, multicast</td>
<td>Sharing (equally?) with parties and others (major powers, SC/GA, troop contributors); sensitivity to parties views</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A. Walter Dorn.
documents, extortion to obtain information, etc. Since such activities can be categorically dismissed, the most interesting studies can be made in the grey area.

The limitations on intelligence-gathering are legal as well as moral, political, and practical. The UN, being a law-abiding, as well as partly law-creating, organization, pays careful attention to the legal limits placed upon its field missions. To begin with, the UN Charter in Article 2(7) states that:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... [except for the] enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

While this provision is often interpreted as a prohibition, it is in fact, neutral. The Charter itself may not be used as a basis to authorize intervention (except for UN enforcement measures), but one can argue that the UN acting on its own authority or based on customary international law (e.g.,
the implied powers doctrine accepted by the International Court of Justice\(^7\)
may selectively make such interventions (including information-gathering
at an early stage). This is an important argument, since modern conflicts
are largely internal in character, and UN intervention is becoming
increasingly significant and frequent in such important areas as human
rights and preventive action, which require in-depth monitoring of
domestic affairs and early intervention.

A significant legal and political constraint on UN behavior arises from the
mandate of the mission, usually supplied by the Security Council, and the
Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) or the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) into which the UN enters with the host state and/or the local
authorities, including the combatants. The agreement almost always
stipulates that the UN PKO and its members will “respect all local laws
and regulations” (which could presumably include laws on monitoring of
military activities). The standard SOMA/SOFA also requires that they
“refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial
nature of their duties.”\(^8\) PKOs are usually exceedingly careful not to
wander too far from the mandate or original agreement, either in their
monitoring or other actions, for fear of jeopardizing the consent or
cooperation of the parties.

An excellent, but tragic, example of the “sovereignty constraints” on
information-gathering and sharing was provided by the UN Iran-Iraq
Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), prior to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait.\(^9\) The mission was mandated in 1988 to monitor the cease-fire
between Iran and Iraq. Since the July 1990 movement of Iraqi troops was
southbound toward Kuwait rather than eastbound toward Iran, the UN
observers could not officially report on them. UNIIMOG monitors saw
plenty of evidence of an Iraqi buildup far in excess of that required for
training or exercise purposes. Housed at the Shatt Al Arab hotel, beside
the southern terminus of the main Iraqi railway, UN team number 6, for
instance, obtained a clear view of extensive Iraqi preparations, including
the establishment of third-line maintenance and supply depots, and the
steady flow of tons of military equipment (including tanks, trucks, and
rockets) and thousands of personnel. But the UN mission headquarters,
located in Baghdad, had imposed a reporting ban on any activities and
equipment directed toward the south. The Iraqi government threatened to
expel the UN if it did not comply.\(^10\)

The then-UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar would later write:
“The major powers knew in advance that a very large Iraqi force was
moving towards the Kuwaiti border. I did not have such knowledge . . . I
failed to anticipate [Saddam Hussein’s] aggressive intent.” While Perez de Cuéllar fails to mention the evidence in the possession of UN peacekeepers that could have been sought, he does draw an important lesson:

The United Nations and the Secretary-General, in particular, should have better sources of information on developments such as large troop movements that pose a threat to the peace. And the United Nations, as much or more than national governments, should have the skill and insight to understand the import of such information and take appropriate preventive action.

Information about armaments, their movements and sources, is a common need in proactive PKOs. In some cases, the importation of weapons constitutes a violation of peace agreements or Security Council resolutions. In most cases, they are destabilizing to the peace and even threatening to the UN personnel. The UN faced this challenge as early as 1962 in the Congo, when the UN Force Commander asked the Military Information Branch (MIB) to conduct a “special mission” to gather intelligence from surrounding African countries. The Branch nominated a French-speaking Canadian officer to undertake this mission. The Canadian contingent commander, however, refused to accept the request, stating that Canadian personnel could not participate in missions outside of the Congo without the approval of their government, and that approval was unlikely to be forthcoming considering the covert nature of the task.

In the Congo operation, more peacekeepers were killed than in any other venture (until the ongoing UN operations in the former Yugoslavia), thus making the development of the MIB a critical requirement even at that time. Many lessons on the opportunities, uses, and limitations of UN intelligence-gathering can be learned from this early experience.

1. Case Study: The UN Operation in the Congo

The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 1960–1964, was a forerunner of the modern multidimensional peacekeeping operation in many ways: as a mission deeply involved with internal affairs, national succession, the training of national armed forces, and the maintaining of internal security. ONUC was also a pioneering mission in its use of intelligence-gathering, both of secret information and the use of secret means. But its intelligence activities had never been documented until my 1995 study.

Fortunately, the once-secret files of the Military Information Branch (MIB) are in meticulous order and excellent shape in the UN archives. The MIB, the UN’s first dedicated intelligence-gathering unit, gradually developed a range of secret activities. These include signals intelligence (SIGINT, in
the form of radio message interception), photographic intelligence (PHOTOINT, in the form of aerial reconnaissance), and human Intelligence (HUMINT, in form of interrogated prisoners, informants, and agents).

Signals Intelligence The radio message interception system grew naturally. Early on in the operation, an MIB intelligence officer was surprised on a visit to Kabalo in northern Katanga province to discover that the Ethiopian battalion commander, Lt-Col. Alemu, had established an improvised interception service. Messages were intercepted using a commercial receiver, while a local Baluba tribesman took down messages in Swahili and translated them into French. The security of the Katangese radio networks was found to be “extremely bad.” In February 1962, the military advisor to the new Secretary-General U Thant, Major General Indar Jit Rikhye of India, agreed to the establishment of a broad radio monitoring organization for the MIB. Rikhye justified such a monitoring system on the somewhat questionable grounds that it was an “invisible” activity and therefore did not violate ONUC’s agreements with various Congolese factions, notably its cease-fire agreement with Katanga.

Radio intercepts provided voluminous intelligence, and were particularly useful during ONUC’s December 1962/January 1963 Katanga campaign (“Operation Grand Slam”) to remove foreign mercenaries, gain complete freedom of movement in the province, and bring about the end of the Katangese secession. While many messages contained mere trivialities and irrelevancies of minimal use to ONUC, some described important facts and details crucial to its operations. ONUC learned of orders issued by Katangese authorities for bombardment and reconnaissance missions, and obtained information regarding troop movements, arms shortages, and hidden arms caches. They were able to prevent Katanga from bombing the Elizabethville airfield and attacking Albertville. Since some messages were sent in code, the MIB procured a code-cracking capability. The Swedes employed in this job were largely successful, though some keys eluded them.

The service was also authorized to monitor broadcasts of foreign radio stations and Radio Katanga. This provided valuable forewarning when Katangese President Moïse Tshombé and his Interior Minister, Godefroid Munongo, used public radio broadcasts to incite citizen violence against UN peacekeepers and even to call for the death of the UN representative in Elizabethville. ONUC soldiers could thus prepare themselves for threats from both Katangese civilians (including children) and military and paramilitary personnel.
Photointelligence  Again, early on, ONUC realized that valuable intelligence could be gleaned from an existing activity: aircrews of UN and commercial transport aircraft working for the UN were overflying sensitive areas. Mandatory debriefings of all military transport and charter company aircrews was instituted. When ONUC acquired over a dozen planes from Sweden, India, and Ethiopia, constituting what was called the “UN Air Force,” a major task was aerial reconnaissance. Aircraft specially equipped for photoreconnaissance and a photointerpretation detachment were dispatched to the Congo by Sweden in November 1962.

Aerial reconnaissance was particularly useful since detailed maps of the Congo were unavailable, and because ONUC transportation and communication was poor in much of the country. The UN often had no other means of obtaining information except by continuous visual and photoreconnaissance from the air. Aerial intelligence supplied ONUC with vital information prior to its campaign in Katanga. The MIB was able to reappraise its estimation of Katangese air capability. Not only were many FAK (Katangese Armed Forces) planes which had previously been cited by ONUC found to be unserviceable, but it was determined that Katangese ammunition stockpiling was occurring at only a few airfields. Also, reports of antiaircraft batteries and underground aircraft shelters at some Katangese airfields could be rejected.

Human Intelligence (Prisoners, Informants, and Agents) Actual or suspected mercenaries captured or detained by ONUC forces underwent a formal interrogation procedure. While this term sometimes implies brutality, there is no indication that “interrogations” conducted by MIB officers were anything but scrupulous. Memos distributed by the ONUC Command instructed UN forces to comply with the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners.

The procedure sometimes led to positive results. For example, the interrogation of several suspected mercenaries in March 1962 was particularly helpful in evaluating FAK’s air capacity. The intelligence obtained pointed to the presence of only modest numbers of small aircraft in Katanga, and revealed vigorous efforts by Katanga to purchase transport and fighter aircraft.

MIB officers also conducted interrogations of asylum-seekers from the Katangese gendarmerie and bureaucracy. On occasion, this was an invaluable way for gathering intelligence. For example, Cleophas Kanyinda, a Katangese government clerk responsible for paying the salaries of mercenaries, fled to ONUC’s Tunisian camp on 25 November 1962. There, he divulged the names and whereabouts of several dozen
mercenaries. David Sutherland and John Franklin, vehicle mechanics for the Katangese gendarmerie, sought asylum with the UN in late summer 1962 after they were ordered to participate in transport convoys. The two disclosed the names of 52 mercenaries and revealed the location of several large weapons dumps near Jadotville. They also informed ONUC of the import of 600 Landrovers into Katanga from Ndola, Rhodesia. (It was near the town of Ndola, coincidentally, that Dag Hammarskjold lost his life in a plane crash in September 1961, the cause of which was never determined conclusively.) On the basis of this arms information, the MIB instructed officers to make “discreet inquiries” (presumably with contacts in Rhodesia) in order to confirm the details. An inquiry was urged because, “... premised on the fact that Government permission would be required for their import ... [c]onfirmation of this information may even lead to our knowing if the Rhodesian Government helped [Katanga in securing] this deal.”

ONUC’s use of informants has been portrayed as a “comic” and rather scanty enterprise. In 1962, Conor Cruise O’Brien, who had served as the ONUC representative in Elisabethville, suggested that this activity was restricted to the employment in Elisabethville of “one Greek ex-policeman with an imperfect knowledge of French” (who was known by the Katangese gendarmerie as “Chief of the United Nations Intelligence Services in Katanga”) and “a few Baluba houseboys.”

Informants, both paid and unpaid, were utilized more extensively than O’Brien’s account suggests. For example, in 1962 an intelligence officer (IO) with the Irish battalion kept a mercenary “on tap” in order to glean information. At the same time, the Tunisian battalion’s IO maintained a Belgian contact in Kipushi (on the Katangese border with Northern Rhodesia) to learn of troop and arms movements. The IO also had several contacts in the Elisabethville post office, which he regarded as a “very useful method of collecting information.” Using these contacts, ONUC was able to locate a box of detonators consigned to a Belgian mining company, and to intercept an important letter to a Katangese government minister.

One notable and successful use of informants was the search on 6 April 1962 of an Elisabethville warehouse which uncovered 40–50 aircraft engines and a wealth of other aircraft parts. The search was conducted after an inside source informed ONUC’s Elisabethville headquarters of the location of this cache and noted that it was set to be shipped elsewhere for assembly. The source thus enabled ONUC to thwart an escalation of FAK’s air capability.
ONUC also had contact with informants within the Katangese government and kept contacts outside of the Congo. The MIB based its April 1961 estimate of the number of foreign mercenaries in the Katangese gendarmerie ("between 400–550") on "informants in [Katangese] government circles," in addition to statements by mercenaries. MIB's July 1962 assessment of the Katanga military forces was based in part on information provided by "five regular European sources all with indirect access to military information," each of whose information corroborated with the others. In March 1962 informants carried out an investigation (without any positive results) in Congo (Brazzaville) of a report that six FAK Fougamaster jets were stationed at Pointe Noire.23

Information provided by informants was a mixed basket, as were details dispensed by prisoners and asylum-seekers. The MIB had no means of confirming or denying much of the information provided by these sources. Informants sometimes merely reported on statements made by others, such as Katangese politicians or gendarmerie officers. The information they provided was consequently only as accurate as the information provided to them. Since it was in the Katangese interest to provide assurances of safety to its residents (not to mention keeping informants in Katanga misinformed), it is not surprising that information provided by some informants grossly exaggerated Katanga's military capacity. For example, two informants were each told repeatedly and separately that the FAK had assembled 20–30 Fouga jets at Kolwezi by late 1962. But, as noted, aerial intelligence had suggested that FAK capabilities were minimal (fewer than a dozen jets), an opinion that was ultimately verified during ONUC's December 1962/January 1963 Katanga operation.

The use of agents by the MIB touches upon the issue of the limits of UN intelligence-gathering techniques. The Chief of Military Information, N. Borchgrevink, noted in 1962 that "[UN] agents have ... been used on a very limited scale," and further stipulated that the "field of work for UN agents was in the Congo and in its neighbour states, from which arms supplies and mercenaries enter the Congo."

Within ONUC itself there was evidently a reluctance to accept the use of agents. ONUC Force Commander Kebbede Guebre, for instance, thought it "not advisable" at all for the UN to employ professional intelligence agents. Fear of a fall from grace if the UN was discovered to be employing "spies" in the Congo and elsewhere seemed enough to outweigh the benefits that such exercise might have provided. So ONUC did not systematize the use of agents. That was something that the UN did only much later, in Somalia.
National Intelligence Sources

ONUC had very little contact with the national intelligence agencies in the Congo. While the United States government was fully supporting the mandate and goals of ONUC in the UN Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had agents operating in the Congo with a very different agenda. At one point, CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, sent instructions to its Leopoldville station chief to assassinate Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a man whom ONUC had responsibility to guard. Needless to say, the CIA, as well as British and French intelligence (which largely shared U.S. intelligence goals), provided ONUC with very little support. (This example illustrates another reason for the UN to have some inherent intelligence capacity: to be aware of the range of activities, potential or actual, of national intelligence agencies.)

In other PKOs, the UN fared better, in terms of the amount of U.S. imagery data shared: for instance, satellite photos were shown (not given) to the Force Commander of the UN Emergency Force in the mid-1960s; U-2 aerial photographs of Cuba were given to the Secretary-General’s Military Adviser during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962; and satellite imagery was shared with selected personnel (mainly from NATO countries) in the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia during 1993–1995. In the Somalia operation in 1993–1994, the United States provided a great deal of information through its Intelligence Support Element (ISE). Indeed, modern peacekeeping in the 1990s has experienced a revolution in intelligence sharing, as well as intelligence-gathering.

2. Information-Gathering in Modern Peacekeeping Operations

The end of the Cold War gave rise to an expansion in the mandates, scope, and capabilities of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Until 1992, the largest and most complex such operation had been ONUC, with nearly 20,000 peacekeepers at its maximum. The UN force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR, 1992–1995) employed at one point more than 40,000 troops. The mandates for most modern peacekeeping operations are broad, and have included sanctions monitoring, the protection of so-called “safe areas,” ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, support to refugees, elections monitoring, infrastructure development, etc. Today, the peacekeeping forces employed are not drawn merely from the usual “middle powers” and non-aligned states, which were the staple of the classical peacekeeping, but now include major powers such as Britain, France, and, to some extent, Russia and the United States (which has supplied US/UN peacekeepers in Macedonia and Somalia, and civilians in other operations, such as in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique). These
technologically advanced nations brought in new means and methods. Also,
the end of Cold War rivalry reduced the fear in the UN Secretariat of the
previous criticism from major powers (especially the USSR) that the UN
peacekeepers were overstepping their bounds.

Another impetus for intelligence-gathering in the new world of internal,
ethnic conflict was that the UN often found itself in a vulnerable position
where conflicting parties would take advantage of the naivete or
vulnerability of the UN. In the former Yugoslavia, Serb, Croatian, and
Muslim forces have frequently probed the UN to uncover and benefit
from the UN’s knowledge gaps and other weaknesses. (On several
occasions the Serb forces actually took UN peacekeepers hostage and used
them as human shields against bombing raids by NATO.)

In traditional peacekeeping, the policy and practice of troop contributors
was to minimize or ignore the military intelligence component because of
the belief that intelligence-gathering could undermine or compromise the
principle of impartiality. But in the 1990s, with the PKOs functioning
under more trying circumstances, the attitudes have changed. Intelligence
personnel from the middle powers (e.g., Canada) and major powers (e.g.,
France, U.K.) were increasingly sent to dangerous places such as Croatia,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia. Interestingly, UN headquarters
in New York City rarely or never asked for such personnel, but once in
the field, intelligence officers were much used and appreciated by
colleagues, both in the field and at UN headquarters. It was found, for
example, that professional intelligence officers had better knowledge of
intelligence procedures and better access to foreign intelligence sources and
agencies. Those who had security clearances were able to obtain
information that otherwise would not have been available. This gave rise,
on occasion, to some awkward, if not ridiculous situations. For example,
in UNPROFOR, a Canadian peacekeeper with NATO clearance received
U.S. satellite photographs (useful to determine his operational
deployment) but he was not permitted to show the images to his UN
commander, who was a French officer.

The incorporation of military information/intelligence units became
common in modern PKOs. In several recent operations, these sections
have been labeled as G2, in accordance with standard military practice. In
the Rwanda operation (UNAMIR) in 1995, after the genocide, the G2
incorporated six intelligence officers. The Haiti operation was among the
best-staffed operations in terms of intelligence, where there were 29 such
officers, all Canadian. In Somalia, the UNOSOM “Information
Management Office,” referred to as “U2” by U.S. forces, was significant, with over a dozen personnel, but was dwarfed by the U.S.’s own information collection agencies there.26

After the Cold War, the UN still had many challenges and limitations in dealing with secret intelligence. In a lessons-learned seminar on Somalia in 1995, participants suggested that “the United Nations must continue to move beyond its earlier attitude and reluctance with respect to the propriety of ‘intelligence.’ ”27

In large field operations, major troop contributors sometimes took matters into their own hands, after finding that the United Nations was too limited or slow in intelligence-gathering. One such example is an undercover operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H), where UN peacekeepers were under constant threat.28 In March 1994, troop-contributing nations to UNPROFOR deemed it important to learn about territory and terrain in B-H areas where the UN was not present — about 70 percent of the country at the time. While the UN had, in theory, complete freedom of movement, its vehicles and personnel were routinely prohibited from proceeding through the array of checkpoints. An “intelligence gap” endangered the safety of peacekeepers, because of possible weaponry, forces, and supplies in the restricted areas. To gain this information, several European troop contributors to the UN force (including Britain and France) assembled a group of individuals and put them under cover.

The group presented themselves to various Bosnian authorities as members of a European tourist association. They explained that the war would eventually end and that Yugoslavia would once again become a major tourist center, potentially the “playground of Europe.” They needed to scout out various possible resort centers, survey the landscape (including climbing hills and following hiking trails), examine the state of repair of buildings (which future tourists would presumably inhabit), check the conditions and capacities of the roads (to see if buses (or tanks) could travel on them), etc. While under this cover, they moved about B-H, adding greatly to their knowledge and intelligence.

This operation was almost certainly done without the UN’s authorization. The UN has a policy of not carrying out undercover activities, but nation states can assume the responsibility themselves. Under certain specific circumstances, when lives are threatened, this practice can be tolerated by the UN. There have been, for example, many special forces and undercover units in the former Yugoslavia, numbering in the hundreds or perhaps thousands of personnel, and presumably many intelligence-gathering operations undisclosed to the UN.
The PKOs in Somalia (UN Operations in Somalia: UNOSOM I, II, and III) had an even greater intelligence component. Somalia was called a "humint rich" environment. In the UN's first operation (UNOSOM I, 1992–1993), some fifty UN military observers (UNMOs) were deployed. The Somali people offered much information in casual conversation. While the force commander did not authorize payments to locals by UNMOs, he did suggest that, as an expression of gratitude, the UNMOs could present tea bags or similar gifts to those who had been helpful.\textsuperscript{28} The United States intervention (UNITAF) led to the mounting, under U.S. auspices, of an enormous intelligence effort. At one point, the major target was the leader of one faction, Mohamed Farah Aideed, who, after declared a "wanted" criminal by the United States and the UN, went into hiding to avoid arrest. Despite much technology and the deployment of its specially trained forces (a Ranger battalion), the United States was not able to find, let alone apprehend, Aideed. In the UN's second Somalia operation (UNOSOM II, 1993–1995), the UN did, in fact, pay informants and agents for the regular provision of information. The chief administrative officer kept a list of such persons in his safe, along with amounts paid to each.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, the UN may well have crossed into the "black zone" of prohibited activities, but a final judgment of its action would entail a more careful examination of the UN's circumstances, needs and methods.

3. Human Rights Monitoring: An Important New Information Source

One of the most important expansions in modern peacekeeping has been the monitoring of human rights within states, which necessarily involves a certain degree of secrecy. UN human rights investigators, often part of a larger PKO, must encourage their witnesses to describe horrible acts they saw, experienced or even committed. Often, they must assure the witnesses that their names and identities will be kept confidential.

In Guatemala, two UN bodies were created to oversee human rights: a Truth Commission,\textsuperscript{30} whose mandate was to investigate atrocities committed during the 36 days of civil war (up to 1994), and MINUGUA, which investigates current abuses (since 1994). Both bodies had to take precautions to ensure that witnesses willing to provide information not be identified. For example, human rights observers/investigators had to make sure they were not being followed before attending meetings with witnesses and informants. In fact, the Truth Commission hired
carefully-selected Guatemalans, who made themselves inconspicuous by driving in their own unassuming pickup trucks, dressing in ordinary Guatemalan fashion and blending into the crowd. Many of the meetings were conducted at bars and at night, a far cry from the traditional UN observer patrolling under a UN flag and in conditions of maximum visibility.

The Guatemalan military has kept not only the UN monitors under surveillance but also officials of the Guatemalan government. While peace was being negotiated in the early 1990s, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar recalls, the Guatemalan President "found it necessary to communicate with my representative, [Francesc] Vendrell, through a used car dealer because he knew that all of his telephones were tapped" by the military.31

The Truth Commission had a stronger mandate than MINUGUA for investigation: it could exhume bodies, while MINUGUA could "look at but not touch" the evidence supplied to it. But because the Truth Commission was not allowed to assign blame to individuals ("name names") in its reports, it often employed a system of pseudonyms in its internal documents, and still keeps the links to real names carefully secured in safes.

In Haiti, UN human rights monitors had the difficult task of monitoring the local police units to which they were attached. Naturally, the Haitian police officers were wary about talking about the beating of detainees and other forms of abuses they may have witnessed or committed. But by combining confessions with a system of support, rehabilitation, and confidentiality, UN officials found that "the police were dying to talk. . . . We just had to create a space where they felt comfortable."32

Human rights NGOs have often supplied the UN with important information. Pérez de Cuéllar recently revealed that before making each trip abroad to countries known to commit human rights violations, "I was briefed confidentially by Amnesty International on individual cases of human rights abuse on which I might usefully intervene. It was my practice to take along a list of such cases on my travels . . . ."33 He also highlighted the importance of secrecy:

The Secretary-General can quite often intervene confidentially with a regime and gain the freedom, or at least an improvement in conditions, of individual political prisoners. Yet a critical public report can jeopardize his ability to perform this useful service.34
The element of secrecy became very important when Pérez de Cuéllar had to deal with the murky and tense world of hostage takers as he attempted to gain the release of those held in the Middle East. For example, a UN peacekeeper, Lt. Col. William Higgins of the U.S. Marines, was abducted in 1988 by an unknown group calling itself the “Organization for the Oppressed of the World.” Under-Secretary-General Philip Goulding met secretly with senior Arab officials but was unable to obtain the officer's release. A videotape, which was eventually released to a newspaper in Beirut, Lebanon, was analyzed to reveal that it was indeed Colonel Higgins's body hanging from a scaffold.  

In dealing with hostage taking, it is important for the UN to know what governments are doing to save their nationals who are being held hostage, but, as might be expected, governments are reluctant to reveal their intelligence sources (for fear of compromising them) or their actions (for fear of exposing them, such as deals with terrorists). A case in point concerned UN efforts to release British hostages, including Alec Collett, a British journalist writing for the UN Relief and Works Agency in Palestine, who was taken hostage in 1985. Pérez de Cuéllar notes in his memoirs: “We kept in close touch with British authorities who were making their own efforts to free Collett although they never informed the United Nations of what they were doing.”

Like Higgins, Collett is thought to have been murdered. The hostage takers claimed that Collett was a British spy, working for the United States on behalf of Israel, a lethal combination of allegations. This highlights how the UN must be ever-so-careful in permitting even the perception of intelligence agency complicity in sensitive mission areas such as the Middle East.

A more successful and encouraging outcome was obtained with the release of other hostages (including British citizen Terry Waite, and American Terry Anderson) in the fall of 1991. In top secrecy, Pérez de Cuéllar sent his “special adviser,” Giandomenico Picco, to meetings with Iranian and Libyan leaders, as well as to engage in secret negotiations with underground groups in Lebanon. While enduring blindfolds, endless car rides, and a risk of himself being taken hostage, Picco was the channel for the exchange of secret information between Israel and Iran, as well as others during the episode. His efforts proved quite successful.

**IV. INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION**

As information is gathered, it must be analyzed for purposes of verification, corroboration, and extraction of the most important details, as well as to identify new requirements and information methods. Even the analysis of
open information occasionally needs to be, in hazardous conditions, a secret activity. For one, keeping secret the lists of open sources and names of people might be required to prevent others from tampering with them. More importantly, nations or conflicting parties could object if they found out that the United Nations might be analyzing their behavior. Should the analysis involve scenario-building, including worst-case estimates, prediction, and passing judgment on a leader’s character (which is often necessary to make realistic assessments and predictions), conflicting parties would find this activity offensive. Some governments might object, based on fears of UN interference, and label the activity as UN spying.

For instance, when the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) was established in the UN Secretariat in 1987, a group of nine conservative United States senators openly objected to its creation and proffered a bill in the Senate to withhold more U.S. dues in the amount that the office would cost. They claimed that ORCI would be used as a base for Soviet espionage, even though the office was placed under an African (James Jonah from Sierra Leone), and its information-gathering was basically limited to taking newspaper reports from the wire services. But more amenable leaders in the U.S. government prevailed. State Department officials convinced the senators of the lack of foundation for their fears, and the bill was dropped. Still, the UN has to take into account such domestic concerns, especially when those maintaining the fears have their hands on the national purse strings.

Yet, the UN has little difference in analysis, scenario-building, and prediction. Desk officers do virtually none of this, being overloaded with simple information-gathering and a minimal of organizing. The strongest analytical capacity exists within the Information and Research (I&R) Unit of the Situation Center, which is part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Though small, with only four “intelligence” officers, it has the greatest “reach” in terms of information-gathering and analysis because these individuals are “connected” to national intelligence systems, having been seconded from them. Created in 1994 with only a U.S. intelligence officer, the unit grew to include four officers drawn from four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, Russia, UK, and the United States). The analysts who work there unashamedly, though unofficially, call themselves intelligence officers, which is not surprising since they are mostly drawn from the intelligence branches of their militaries. They have produced important information/intelligence reports which have gone well beyond the scope of regular UN reports, including information on arms flows and covert
assistance from states to the conflicting parties and leaders. They have evaluated the motivations of contending parties, prepared threat assessments, and made other forecasts.

With the UN’s decision to phase out from service in DPKO the gratis officers (whose salaries are paid by their national governments), the future of this important unit is in doubt. Many developing nations, which could not afford to send gratis officers, were resentful of the over-representation of Western governments in the Department.

Secrecy in the workings and deliberations of the Security Council, the body primarily responsible for guiding UN peace operations, is a matter of contention in the UN. The five permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) began in 1988 to engage in intensive and frequent private consultations. This process, while welcome as a measure of cooperation between them, became formalized with frequent closed-door meetings, freezing many UN members and the world public out of the picture. The Security Council currently meets far more regularly in closed, rather than open, sessions in a private room next to the Council chambers. Non-Council members cannot attend unless they are specifically invited or involved in the conflict. This practice of strict secrecy naturally creates suspicion and apprehension among other UN members, who remind the Security Council that, according to Article 24 of the Charter, the council “acts on their behalf” — but, ironically, doesn’t let them know what they are planning. Countries like Canada, which often have military and civilian personnel in the field under UN command, feel that the information sharing is inadequate.\(^{39}\) UN members, including General Assembly itself, have repeatedly called for more transparency in the Security Council’s deliberations. Gradual improvements, such as more frequent briefings of non-members and more publicly available documentation, have been made.

Confidentiality

The ability to carefully and wisely distinguish between what should be open and what should be secret (and for how long) is the key to creating confidence within both the UN and the international community. An effective confidentiality system is necessary to maintain the proper balance, whether in the Security Council, at UN headquarters, or in field operations. In this regard, the UN system is weak in comparison with that of most governments, and devotes few resources to it. While the UN Secretariat has “categories” of information confidentiality (UN-restricted, confidential, secret, and top secret), specific means for handling of
information in these categories is not recognized or followed, in terms of either physical security (locks) or dissemination and declassification procedures. Some PKOs instituted their own classification systems with more than the four categories. Sometimes the UN is overly secretive (even about trivial documents over forty years old) and sometimes sensitive information is shared indiscriminately. Numerous leaks have caused some governments to consider the UN as a sieve. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, from his unique vantage point atop the UN hierarchy from 1981 to 1991, admits to this:

The diplomatic missions have always felt that security in the Secretariat is lax and that any confidential information provided to the Secretariat would quickly be widely circulated. In general, this is true...

That the Soviets, as well as other employees, at the UN reported regularly to their national governments on important developments was well known. Pérez de Cuéllar notes: “As long as the Cold War continued, Soviet staff members, whether KGB or not, owed their first loyalty to Moscow rather than to the United Nations. . . . As a result, and to their understandable frustration, the Soviet nationals in my office were excluded from sensitive functions.” Twenty years earlier, Secretary-General U Thant sometimes purposefully used his Soviet Under-Secretary-General to convey selected information to the Soviet government, rather than going through official channels.

Within the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, confidential information is usually handled more carefully. Pérez de Cuéllar reports that “in dealing with sensitive problems, I relied on the support of a very small staff in whose loyalty I had complete confidence.” He adds that his record of keeping secrets helped gain the confidence of the U.S. government, which occasionally provided his office with intelligence assessments.

One such incidence occurred in early April 1988, when a representative of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. Department of State provided my chef de cabinet, Virendra Dayal, with a comprehensive assessment of the status of the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The information provided gave me reason to think that just possibly, after months of frustration, the time might be approaching when a cease-fire could be obtained.

The question has been raised in the UN whether it should undertake formal agreements with governments for the regular sharing of information/intelligence, thereby increasing the amount of information that the UN could count on. Governments currently share information
with the UN on a "need to know basis," for example, when the governments think that the UN needs to know. Some UN officials would prefer a pipeline of regular information, so that they could depend on a constant input from various sources and make the choice themselves as to which information is useful. The UN could then better corroborate information among different sources and decrease the danger that information is provided in a partial, biased form with interpretation and fact combined. The disadvantage could be that the UN might be formally restricted on how it shares this information, once received. Also, the UN could suffer from information overload (perhaps deliberately by the supplier), given the secretariat's lack of staff and expertise in intelligence management.

What, then, should be the UN's policy on secrecy? A balance between secrecy and openness obviously needs to be achieved. While information secrecy should be situation-dependent, guidelines for the classification of information are valuable. The emphasis should be on openness, but, in cases where secrecy is warranted, it should be strictly maintained. One approach or "rule" is suggested here. Information should be open unless by divulging it, the UN would:

a. result in death or injury to individuals
b. bring about failure of a UN mission or mandate
c. violate the right to privacy of one or more individuals
d. compromise confidential sources or methods

The degree of secrecy (restricted, confidential, secret, top secret) would depend on the extent of the threat of information release. With each higher category, the degree of security is increased through better physical security (e.g., using safes, restricted areas, etc.), closer monitoring of documents (e.g., by numbering each copy), and routine checks by an authority made responsible for the confidentiality system (something that has been done in the newly-established Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, located in The Hague).

The UN should also have a smooth procedure for declassification. Currently, the UN archives have a 20-year rule, though any information marked secret or top secret must be reviewed by all the relevant departments (DPKO, DPA, etc.) even after that period has passed. In practice, this system has many failings, and requests for the declassification may take years to wind through the system. Many national government models could be reviewed by the UN as it seeks to establish a more robust and yet flexible confidentiality regime.
UNSCOM

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was the most intrusive and extensive monitoring operation in UN history, with a substantial intelligence component. Although not a peacekeeping mission but a disarmament operation established under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter (Chapter VII), it shared many features in common with PKOs. In particular, it conducted monitoring in accordance with Security Council resolutions and with written agreement from the host state, for example, the ceasefire agreement which included Iraq’s pledge to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction. To carry out in-country monitoring by international (UN) officials, UNSCOM needed, as do peacekeepers, at least a minimum of cooperation and consent from the host state. This was not always forthcoming. In the end it was denied.

The UNSCOM experience provides many examples and lessons in intelligence directly relevant to peacekeeping. UNSCOM demonstrated several new and ambitious means of information-gathering, analysis, and dissemination. In pushing the limits of the grey zone of UN information-gathering, it helped clarify some of the boundaries between recommended and prohibited behavior. Many novel features and significant pitfalls of the Iraq operation were revealed by a former UNSCOM Chief Inspector, Scott Ritter, after his resignation in August 1998.46

One area of UNSCOM innovation was the extensive use of high technology to gather information. High-tech surveillance devices helped considerably to find hidden weapons systems and components in unlikely buildings and locations, both above and below ground and even under water. Some UNSCOM missions included U.S. Navy divers who scoured the bottom of certain Iraqi rivers to find weapons components. UNSCOM used U.S. high-altitude U-2 planes to cover vast tracks of Iraqi land, an activity that helped spot suspicious sites and vehicle movements.47 UNSCOM also received high-resolution U.S. satellite imagery, which helped to provide an estimate (downwards) of the number of undeclared mobile missile launchers and to discover camouflaged roads to sensitive sites. Germany provided helicopters with ground penetrating radar in an effort to discover Iraqi SCUD missiles and metal components buried under sand, though no missiles were found.

UNSCOM installed video cameras at sensitive dual-use sites (like foundries) to make sure that no undeclared activities (e.g., missile fabrication) were taking place. These cameras and other unmanned sensors transmitted information continuously to the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Center (BMVC) to permit surveillance of key alarm indicators, such as sound and heat from machine operation. Video cameras were also employed during inspections, and even in negotiations with Iraqi authorities, as a manner of recording personal responses and remarks for later playback. In one inspection, UNSCOM personnel filmed a convoy of heavy tractor-trailers leaving a site that was about to be inspected. These transports carried the unmistakable forms of Calutrons, proving that Iraq had sought to produce highly enriched uranium.

Signals intelligence also became a part of the UNSCOM effort. Britain supplied sensitive communication scanners for surveillance of Iraqi military communications, in an effort to reveal the Iraqi weapons concealment mechanism. The BMVC itself employed a variety of high-tech counterintelligence measures, including electronically swept facilities with double-door access and encrypted telephone links to UN headquarters. Inspection teams in the field also had satellite telephones for direct communications to New York, which were particularly useful during tense standoffs with Iraqi authorities. An early incident occurred when a group of UNSCOM inspectors were immobilized in a Baghdad parking lot after they had uncovered secret files on Iraq’s nuclear capability. A U.S. national, David Kay, fearing the confiscation of documents, faxed revealing documents directly to Washington, thereby bypassing the UN in New York. Iraq used this instance, and others, to assert that UNSCOM was providing a cover for U.S. espionage, and Kay was later reprimanded by UN officials.

On-site inspections were the backbone of UNSCOM’s investigations and international inspectors had unprecedented rights. Based on Security Council resolutions, which invoked the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter, UNSCOM could conduct inspections virtually anywhere, anytime, without right of refusal. In practice, UNSCOM had to be sensitive to Iraqi sovereignty and requests. A cat and mouse game was played, with Iraq usually losing out. From inspections, for instance, UNSCOM exposed Iraq’s undeclared chemical weapons and facilities, its nuclear weapons program, and significant elements of its biological weapons program.

UNSCOM also demonstrated the great utility of document searches. Initially the Iraqis were caught off guard, not having sequestered documentation, as it had with the actual weapons and other hardware. The examination of secret documents and correspondence in government files (especially those found in the Agriculture ministry) were especially valuable in tracing Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. Such Iraqi paperwork also helped reveal the nature of Iraq’s concealment effort,
which had to be carefully coordinated among various Iraqi organizations. From vehicle manifests, for example, the movements of certain illicit cargo were tracked. On several occasions, UNSCOM inspectors successfully pursued men fleeing with large bundles of documents (labeled “Top Secret”) under their arms. In addition to translators, UNSCOM employed computer experts to recover deleted files from Iraqi hard drives, an activity which proved especially useful in uncovering information on Iraqi ballistic missile programs.

The greatest revelations, however, came from several high-level defectors, especially Hussein Kamal, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, who was in charge of the Military Industrial Commission. In August 1995 meetings in Jordan with UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus, he described key elements of Iraq’s concealment mechanism, and told of previously unknown bioweapons projects, hidden ballistic missiles, and large document caches. As a result, UNSCOM obtained at his chicken farm 1.5 million pages of hidden documentation (for which the Iraqi government blamed Hussein Kamal, saying he was acting without authorization or government awareness in carrying out the programs described therein) and later found missile production tools at another farm.

Through the process of information-sharing and cooperation with national intelligence agencies, UNSCOM found itself in the black (prohibited) zones. As an operation run by the UN, it had to maintain objectivity and impartiality, in both fact and international perception, in carrying out a specific mandate. But, one of Iraq’s key allegations was that the UNSCOM employed CIA agents. This was consistently discounted in the West, but subsequently revealed to be true by Inspector Ritter. In fact, during one inspection directed at the Special Presidential Guard, UNSCOM was said to have on its inspection team nine CIA paramilitary covert operators who were alleged to have supported a failed coup plot by units of the Guard.

UNSCOM had to be careful not to be too closely associated with the United States because it was routinely called an American pawn by the government of Iraq, on whom it depended for inspection privileges and cooperation. The U.S. domination also boded poorly with Russia and France, who thought that UNSCOM was being used as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, on several occasions overly intrusive UNSCOM inspections were apparently designed to serve as a pretext for U.S. military attacks. Yet, some association with the United States was inevitable. Many UNSCOM inspectors and its deputy head were from the United States, and UNSCOM relied heavily on the United States for technology, inspection personnel, and funding.
A more obvious transgression of UN impartiality was the sharing of UNSCOM intelligence with the military intelligence service of Israel, Iraq's mortal enemy. Ritter himself originally proposed making contact with Israel. The idea was dismissed in 1992, but by 1994 the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM had a channel to the Israeli military intelligence service, Aman, which produced a subsequent stream of information. Ritter arranged for U.S. U-2 images to be delivered to Israeli intelligence through UNSCOM in exchange for Israeli help in interpreting them, so that inspection targets could be more accurately identified. This imagery could potentially be put to other uses by Israel, for example, for future targeting during military operations, or for espionage and sabotage. Indeed, Israel was eager to monitor Saddam Hussein's movements and even passed this information on to Ritter. It also tipped off UNSCOM about an illegal shipment of gyroscopes, enough to provide guidance systems for a dozen missiles, leading to their interception in Jordan with the help of the Jordanian government.

UNSCOM also developed a substantial analytical capability. After its creation in 1991, it initially depended heavily on U.S. information analysis. But after the establishment of an Information Assessment Unit (IAU), it was able to rely more on its own facts and estimates, and those from alternate intelligence sources and agencies. The United States then increasingly sought information from UNSCOM.

Secrecy measures were adopted by UNSCOM, not only in its dealings with foreign intelligence agencies, but also in its relations with Iraq itself. Two secret agreements were negotiated between the UN and Iraq on the modalities and limits of UN inspections: the agreement of 21 June 1996 negotiated by Rolf Ekeus, and a secret protocol of 23 February 1998 resulting from the trip of Kofi Annan to Baghdad. As an organization devoted to transparency, and with a UN Charter that provides that all international agreements should be open, the use of secret memoranda and agreements seems highly duplicitous and easily leads to a loss of credibility in the UN when exposed.

UNSCOM's experience shows the many pitfalls of overly aggressive intelligence-gathering. It also allows some general rules to be proposed. The UN should preferably not use deception in its information-gathering, though surprise plans and non-identification of inspectors can fall in the acceptable (grey) zone. (Under most arms control verification regimes, the host state has the right to reject certain inspectors.) The UN should be open to receiving information from defectors but should not be encouraging them. Signals intelligence should be used only to the extent justified by the inspection mandate. Inspections should be restricted to its
mandate, and member states not be allowed to use inspections for other objectives. For example, inspection targets should be chosen to meet valid inspection goals and not for other national or international purposes. UN bodies, when cooperating with major powers, should not be dominated by them, and instead always remain at arms length in perception and reality. Finally, while the UN may retain secrets, it should not make secret agreements with governments, especially the inspected state.

INFORMATION FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Analyzed information, of both a secret and open nature (i.e., intelligence), is required in UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, severe limits and many shortcomings impede the present system for information-gathering, analysis, and dissemination. Some limits are for valid ethical reasons. The United Nations should avoid “black” areas — the covert activities which are sometimes associated with national intelligence agencies. These include a wide range of nefarious actions, such as the use of fronts, covers, and deception (i.e., the common elements of spying). Bribery, blackmail, distorted propaganda, and double agents are similarly not to be considered. Immediately dissociated should be offensive covert operations, such as sabotage and character or person assassination, which are not part of the information/intelligence spectrum, but which are sometimes performed by some aggressive intelligence agencies.

The grey areas are harder to analyze and are situation dependent (see Figure 1). In threatening circumstances (e.g., the Rwandan genocide of 1994), the UN should be free to receive information volunteered by informants. While offering regular payments to them would be unwise, the UN should look seriously at helping to provide protection and asylum in a willing third state for important informants whose lives are at risk. In Rwanda, the UN ignored this possibility to its own detriment and disgrace, and to the unimaginable suffering of the Rwandese people.

Much information needs to be kept secret for a period of time. But secrecy for valid reasons (see Table 1) must be divorced from secrecy for other reasons (i.e., cover-ups). The UN can still have “clean hands” while maintaining a secrecy regime, so long as it maintains high ethical principles. While deciding on the level of secrecy to be applied and for how long is sometimes difficult, the UN must face this important challenge.

With the end of the Cold War, an ironic situation developed in the intelligence field. The UN moved to center stage in world affairs, with missions of greater scope and authority, and its need for accurate and timely intelligence increased proportionately. National intelligence
agencies, on the other hand, became less crucial to international affairs, as the traditional Cold War spy games became less important. But the UN’s intelligence function did not substantially expand, and the intelligence agencies in the West did not undergo a substantial contraction. At present, the United States government employs an intelligence community of over 40,000 persons in over a half dozen intelligence bodies. By comparison, the United Nations has only four full-time “intelligence” officers51 and these are not even on the UN payroll.52

The major nations have been reluctant to give the UN a greater intelligence mandate because to many of them, intelligence is power, and they believe their own power would be threatened by a UN that possessed real intelligence, especially intelligence they may themselves not have. But, an enlightened view would see international security as an essential prerequisite to national security and the UN as an international institution that needs to be strengthened.53

Ultimately, more resources must be devoted to strengthening the UN’s information/intelligence capacity if it is to engage in proactive peacekeeping and conflict resolution to prevent future wars, genocides, and other crimes against humanity. The UN must be given the means, including information-gathering and analysis, to make manifest its goal, as stated in the opening words of the UN Charter, of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

REFERENCES

1 Major-General Carl von Horn, Commander of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), made this remark in 1960. However, the term persisted informally in the operation, and the heads of the Military Information Branch (MIB) of the ONUC frequently called themselves Chief Intelligence officers. Source: UN archives, “Congo Lessons: Special Report on ONUC operations up to 31 December 1960,” p. 83. [UN Archives, DAG-1/2.2.1:64]

2 The definition of peacekeeping currently used by the UN is: “the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area, with the consent of the parties to the conflict, in order to: stop or contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement.” (Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO) The definition of intelligence, as suggested here, indicates that national intelligence relates to national security and UN intelligence relates to international security, which is a broader concern but has a strong overlap with national security.

3 While the term intelligence has not been used in the title of any official posts within the UN Secretariat, an indication of its greater acceptability is shown by the creation of the position “Intelligence Analyst” in the Office of the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 1997. The functions include "in-depth research and analysis regarding criminal investigations of the conflict of information obtained from multiple sources, ... prepar[ing] strategic or tactical level reports relating to the criminal aspect on persons under investigation. ..." Job Vacancy Announcement, ICTFY, The Hague, 24 November 1997.

4 Dallaire was prevented by UN headquarters officials from using informants to their maximum. For instance, he was prohibited to grant asylum to a key informer who had offered to reveal Hutu plots in extenso in January 1994, three months before the slaughter of close to a million people (mostly Tutsis) in Rwanda. Dallaire, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (the Secretary-General at the time) and Kofi Annan (current Secretary-General and then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), have said that a well-informed, rapid, and strong UN force might have saved the country from its horrible fate. [See Philip Gourevitch, "The Genocide Fax: A Warning That Was Sent to the UN That Might Have Saved Rwanda. Who Chose to Ignore it?", The New Yorker, 11 May 1998, p. 42.]


6 Quoted from Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1962, p. 76.

7 In the Reparation case, the World Court stated: "Under international law, the [UN] Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties," ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 182. The doctrine of implied powers was also adopted in the Certain Expenses and the Namibia cases. Indeed, peacekeeping, with soldiers under the command of the UN Secretary-General, is not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter either.

8 The provisions on respecting local laws and refraining from incompatible activities is contained, for instance, in paragraph 6 of the "Draft Model Status-of-Forces Agreement and Host Countries," which is in circulation at the UN. The relevant rights granted to the UN under the model SOFA includes "freedom of movement throughout the territory" (paragraph 12), freedom to import equipment (to be used exclusively by the PKO (paragraph 15)), unrestricted communications (paragraph 11), and non-interference with mail (paragraph 11).
This information was drawn from an interview with Reg Fountain, a Canadian military officer who served with UNIIMOG, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 11 February 1998.

Once the invasion had begun, Iraq imposed a ban on UN military observers: they could not leave the country (from 2 August for a month or so), and no phone calls were permitted to arrive or be sent to Muslim countries. Conversations (such as those to Canada) were closely monitored.


Memorandum, MIB, “Area of Responsibility,” 6 March 1962 [UN Archives, DAG-13/1.6.5.4.0:1].

Dorn and Bell, “Intelligence and Peace-Keeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960–64,” pp. 11–33. The following section draws from that paper. Detailed citations to UN archival files (located at 345 Park Avenue South in New York City) are available in the original paper.


“Secret Intercepts,” 5 January 1963 (DAG-13/1.6.5.4.0:16 685 — Monitoring Katanga).


Cable #6120, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche to Force Commander Guebre, 24 August 1962.

“Ref. ONUC 7361,” 30 October 1962 (DAG-13/1.6.5.4.0:14 — Arms Traffic).

O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, p. 76.

Ibid.

“Minutes of Intelligence Conference No. 3,” 5 March 1962, p. 2 (DAG-13/1.6.5.7.2.0:18).


According to a U.S. Senate Committee set up in 1975 (the “Church Committee”), the CIA provided its station chief in Leopoldville with toxic biological materials to “produce a disease … indigenous to that area [of Africa]” for application to Patrice Lumumba. The station cabled CIA headquarters: “TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED [BY UN] DAY AND NIGHT … TARGET HAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY [BY] THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE.” However, Lumumba left the house on his own accord, was captured by forces of Joseph Mobutu (the CIA-supported military officer who subsequently ruled the Congo/Zaire until 1997), and was sent to Katanga where he was murdered by the forces of local leader Moïse Tshombe. A UN inquiry concluded Lumumba was killed by his enemies on or shortly after his arrival in
Katanga. Similarly, the Church Committee investigation found that “the toxic substances were never used. . . . There is no suggestion of a connection between the [US] assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba’s death.” [Source: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the “Church Committee”), Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, U.S. Government, Washington, 1975.]

This convention is based on the Continental Staff System, where the headquarters is divided up into 6 branches, numbered one through six. One is personnel, two is intelligence, three is operations, four is logistics, five is civil/military affairs, and six is communications and computers. The letter designator could be A, G, J, N, or U, which designate the headquarters as either Air Force, Ground (or Army), Joint, Naval, or United Nations. Therefore, the G2 is army intelligence, the N3 is navy operations, and U2 would be UN peacekeeping force intelligence.

An example of the use of the term “U2” for UN intelligence and the U2 interaction with the U.S. information center is provided in an After Action Report (AAR) by the Chief of Staff of the 10th Mountain Division dated 1 February 1993, available on the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL-TRADOC, Ft. Leavenworth), Lessons Learned Information Warehouse (LLIW on CD ROM) on peace operations.

Information obtained at the “Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)” organized by the UN DPKO Lesson Learned Unit, 13–15 September 1995, Plainsboro, New Jersey.

This description draws upon a conversation on 10 February 1998 with a senior Canadian peacekeeper who had served as Force Engineer in UNPROFOR.

Information provided by Douglas Mason, former UNOSOM Chief Administrative Officer, at the Comprehensive Seminar on the Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), held in 13–15 September 1995 in Plainsboro, New Jersey.

The Truth Commission in Guatemala was created and organized by the UN, unlike the South African Truth Commission which is purely national in origin and composition.

Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, p. 438.


Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, p. 6.

Ibid., p. 407.

Ibid., p. 104.

Ibid., p. 100.
The composition of the I&R unit, consisting only of seconded nationals from the permanent five members of the Security Council, does create the potential problem that incoming information may be biased toward the interests of the UN’s most powerful states. In practice, however, such natural biases can be taken into account and found acceptable because more information is generally better than less.


Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, p. 168.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 168.

Ibid.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) would outline the procedures for information sharing and handling. For sensitive and secret information, this would require an upgrade of its confidentiality system. Such an MOU is being considered by staff in the UN’s Situation Centre.

Secrecy begets more secrecy, as exemplified by the phrase: “O what a tangled web we weave once we begin to practice to deceive!”

The information and allegations of Scott Ritter are described in detail in an article “Scott Ritter’s Private War,” The New Yorker, 9 November 1998, p. 54, and in his book, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem — Once and For All (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). Though the interpretive and prescriptive elements of Ritter’s analysis are questionable, his detailed description of his own UNSCOM experiences and its information-gathering methods appear to be valid, and are corroborated by other sources.

At first the United States maintained strict control over the U2 operation and image development, and the photographs stayed with the U.S. government. Later, UNSCOM took control over U2 operations, deciding on mission tasking and, with CIA approval, the handling and sharing of imagery.

Ritter further comments that even with the counterintelligence measures, “still we didn’t trust it completely. We had the air conditioner running as loud as we could and repeatedly used the large white marking board instead of talking.” Ritter, Endgame, p. 25.

Ritter, Endgame, p. 141 and p. 181, respectively.

The UN cannot afford to engage in extensive counterintelligence efforts because these would affect the atmosphere of the organization and could result in “witch hunts,” such as those which the UN experienced in the McCarthy era in the early 1950s.

These “intelligence” officers are in the Information and Research Branch of the Situation Center in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
The practical reason for this irony is clear: the UN has been able to secure neither funding nor mandates from member states for the much needed expansion. In fact, the financial squeeze, imposed largely by the United States, has forced it into a contraction: it has 2,000 people fewer than it did in 1985 (out of a total of some 10,000, covering all areas of international affairs, from human rights to environment to peacekeeping). By contrast, the national intelligence agencies did not contract: huge sources of funds continued to flow into them (roughly $26 billion annually in the United States alone). It appears that the capacity for the institutional survival of intelligence agencies in the United States and other Western countries remains great.

Statists may argue that with an independent and effective intelligence capability the intergovernmental UN would begin to become a super-governmental organization. But there is no reason why an intergovernmental organization cannot have the capability to monitor compliance with the rules that are collectively established. On a more practical basis, many states feel that the UN is inherently insecure and any intelligence it came into possession of would inevitably leak to their ‘enemies.’ This is a good reason to devote more effort and resources to developing the UN’s confidentiality system.