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**HUMAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE:
IMPLICATIONS OF ITS COMPLEXITIES FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE
21ST CENTURY**

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2 – APPROACHES TO HUMAN SECURITY	4
The Canadian approach	4
The Dutch approach	5
The Japanese approach	6
The UNDP approach	7
Conclusion	13
CHAPTER 3 – TRENDS IN PSOS	14
The evolution of military intervention	15
The Responsibility to Protect	19
The evolution of PSOs	20
Factors influencing PSOs	22
CHAPTER 4 – NEW APPROACHES TO PSOS	27
The Dutch 3D-approach in the Uruzgan province	27
The Canadian Whole of Government approach	31
The new Dutch Comprehensive Approach Staff Concept	34
CHAPTER 5 – THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE	41
Intelligence models in today’s PSOs	42
Shortcomings of present intelligence models for Human Security Intelligence	46
Human Security Intelligence as a model	49
CHAPTER 6 – HUMAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE IN PSOS	52
Direction	54
Collection	55
Processing	60
Dissemination	64
Human Security Intelligence: Implications and opportunities	66
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION	74
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY	77

ABSTRACT

“Human security” is a debated term to which many approaches exist. The UNDP approach, laid down in the *1994 Human Development Report* is construed around seven aspects, both in terms of physical (freedom from fear) as well as non-physical (freedom from want) security. Since today’s Peace Support Operations (PSOs) increasingly tend to focus on the enhancement of both dimensions of security, the UNDP approach is chosen as the basis for this paper.

Since the end of the Cold War the number of PSOs has increased significantly. The change in UN policy that was originally based on preservation of state sovereignty to the protection of civilians may result in an even further increase in PSOs. Due to the Responsibility to Protect modern PSOs based on forceful interventions can be authorized by the UN Security Council.

Modern PSOs are very complex compared to traditional peacekeeping operations. They are conducted in more complex environments, between the local populace in often intrastate conflicts that take place along ethnic and other internal lines. Intervention forces are confronted with belligerents that revert to asymmetric warfare, as well as the presence of an increasing number of aid organizations, Private Security Firms etc.

In order to deal with these complexities, many nations experiment with new approaches to the conduct of PSOs. Although not really an PSO, this paper discusses the Dutch 3D approach in its mission in Afghanistan, as well as the Canadian Whole of Government Approach. Presently a new Comprehensive Approach is being developed in the Netherlands where military and civil partners will work in one civil military staff to create a unity of effort.

Under the complex circumstances in which today’s PSOs take place, good intelligence is of extreme importance for mission commanders to guide their decision making process. Winning the good will of the local populace is one of the most important centers of gravity. This relies on the perception of local

populace on intervention force as a legitimate power. This perceived legitimacy can only be achieved by addressing both the freedom from want and the freedom from fear dimension in the desired end state. Therefore an appropriate holistic intelligence model is needed with which these threats can be analyzed and the effectiveness of the mission can be measured in relation to the desired end state. Currently used models prove to be insufficient for this task since these models are linear models, focused on operational aspects, rather than human security dimensions. In this paper a Human Security Intelligence model is proposed for PSO missions that is construed around these dimensions and in which the context of the mission area is taken into account.

Given the already increased intelligence requirements within today's PSOs and the further increase that can be expected when Human Security Intelligence is adopted as a concept, the opinion of some strategic think tanks is that countries like the Netherlands should invest heavily in intelligence collection assets, since they assume that human security will improve automatically when more intelligence is available. The analysis of the intelligence process in this paper proves that this assumption is incorrect. Information is often available, but the limited analysis capacity proves to be the most important constraint. Analysis is thus the place where investments are needed most, while information management is a must to ensure that the right information gets to the right persons, at the right place, in the right format and at the right time. Further in the present multi-agency environment of present PSOs, partnership and interoperability between the partnering civil and military organizations should be further developed.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Events in the 21st century like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and many other modern conflicts have made one thing clear: human security as a whole can be threatened anywhere and with many different means. Military conflicts do not just take place between countries. Instead, we face an increase of military conflicts between ethnical and other groups within states or groups of countries, where national borders are less of an issue for these conflicts. Rebels often use national borders as fronts behind which they or their leadership can hide.

The character of warfare has changed from wars between regular armies to insurgencies, terrorism is conducted worldwide, posing a threat to people who were first relatively safe. Threats to human security do not necessarily need to be based on the use or threatened use of conventional weapons. Aspects like cybercrime can form a threat to human security as well because of its ability to disrupt vital public services, financial institutions or other vital institutions.

All these events and trends quickly show the complexities faced in today's Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the need for accurate intelligence upon which appropriate actions can be based. This need is very likely to increase in the future.

One of the values shared by the Dutch and Canadian societies is the enhancement of human security. Therefore it is highly likely that both countries will continue to contribute to many PSOs worldwide, such as peacekeeping operations, UN mandated interventions etc. Due to the UN policy of "Responsibility to Protect" it is likely that military and humanitarian interventions will be authorized by the UN Security Council more often than in the past, which will increase the chances of armed forces of small and middle powers like the Netherlands of getting involved in these PSOs and enforcement operations with all their complexities.

Many strategic think tank organizations, like IKV/Pax Christi¹ therefore believe that countries like the Netherlands should invest heavily in intelligence collection capabilities, since they perceive that larger quantities of available intelligence will automatically increase the possibilities to enhance human security as a whole. Other organizations, like the Dutch Clingendael agency, emphasize the role of “human security” in modern military operations.² However facing the complexity of today’s conflicts and the constraints faced by these small countries, this opinion is rather questionable, which leads to the following thesis:

“The increasing complexity of PSOs and the introduction of the concept of Human Security Intelligence will likely lead to a major increase in intelligence requirements. The opinion that the solution to fulfill these requirements lies in a heavy investments in intelligence collection assets, since more collected intelligence would automatically lead to an improved human security situation, is incorrect. Given the already overloaded analysis staff, increased intelligence collection is even likely to have a counterproductive effect on human security in PSOs because of the inherent risk of the analysts getting drowned in a data overflow, which in turn would lead to an intelligence failure and therefore an increased risk of faulty decisions by mission commanders. Small countries like the Netherlands with limited resources and funding should instead invest in the analysis and dissemination phases of the intelligence cycle in order to make Human Security Intelligence an effective and actionable instrument for decision making in PSOs. As a consequence PSOs get a better chance to improve the human security situation in the mission area.”

This paper aims to defend this thesis by first defining what is meant by the term “human security” from different perspectives and analyzing trends in today’s conflicts and the subsequent implications for the intelligence efforts in PSOs.

¹ IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid. *Policy Brief IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid [Contributions To Civil Protection, the Dutch Armed Forces on their way to 2030]**, Utrecht/the Hague, May 2010

² GenMaj Kees Homan. [“Agility of Military Power in a Changing Security Arena”]* in *Armex 92(1)*, 2008, p.10-13

*Translation from Dutch

In order to deal with the complexities in the mission environment many countries develop approaches to the conduct of PSOs. This paper will discuss the approaches currently applied by the Netherlands (3D-approach) and Canada (Whole of Government) as well as a new Dutch approach that, called the Comprehensive Approach.

A key issue to be analyzed in this paper is how the concept of Human Security Intelligence should be implemented in terms of an appropriate intelligence model. From this model on, the implications for the intelligence process must be analyzed in order to reveal the bottlenecks that hamper the effective production of actionable intelligence as an enabler for the mission decision making process. This paper will end with a number of recommendations for an improved intelligence process, based on opportunities coming from the key trends in PSOs and the described operational approaches.

CHAPTER 2 – APPROACHES TO HUMAN SECURITY

In the Cold War the term security was defined in state-centric and military terms. However, in the 1990's the paradigm took shape in which for some scholars, organizations and governments the individual was the referent object to define security. The term "human security" is an ambiguous and contested one. Definitions vary with their origins.³

This chapter explores different perspectives, from the narrow approach used in Canada in the 1990's to the broad approach of the UNDP in 1994. The Dutch perspective is compared to these two approaches.

Many organizations, like the Sphere Project, NGO's, but also armed forces take different perspectives on the term "human security", however by analyzing different focus points, it becomes clear that these perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but highly interrelated.

The Canadian approach

Canada has a long tradition of values based foreign policy. After the Second World War, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St-Laurent, in his Gray lecture, gave a speech that would become the corner stone for Canadian Foreign policy. In this speech, St-Laurent continuously referred to values and 'principles', such as openness and generosity. St-Laurent contends that "no foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values".⁴ Following this tradition, in 1995, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Lloyd Axworthy, promoted the concept of human security, as a people centric approach of stability and global security, claiming that "lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety and lives".⁵

³ Betts, Eagleton-Pierce. "Editorial Introduction 'Human Security'" in *STAIR* 1 No.2 (2005), p.5

⁴ Nelson Michaud. Chapter 20 "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, ed. Douane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.342

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.344

At its core, the Canadian interpretation of “human security” was defined as “‘freedom of pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives’ – the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, public safety, governance and accountability, and PSOs”⁶. Rob McRae summarizes this interpretation with the term “freedom from fear”.⁷

By 2000, human security appeared on Canada’s budget as an explicit chapter. Axworthy mentions that in Canada’s Security Council issues like “protecting civilians in armed conflict, reforming sanctions regimes to mitigate negative humanitarian outcomes, bolstering the rights of women in places like Afghanistan, and the necessity of humanitarian intervention to protect against a future Rwanda or Srebrenica.”⁸

In several cases the value of human security in Canadian foreign policy led to some concrete actions, like the Canadian contribution to the air war in Kosovo in 1999.⁹ However, the Canadian definition of human security is narrow, as it only focuses on armed conflicts and acts of violence, while other factors like poverty reduction, environmental aspects and other non-kinetic factors are not central to the concept. The use of the concept of human security in Canadian politics depends heavily on the nature of the government. At present the Canadian government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper no longer uses the concept of human security, while for instance the general concept was an important instrument for Prime Minister Lester Pearson, who talked about “individual” security.

The Dutch approach

Although human rights have a prominent place on the Dutch political agenda, the term “human security” is not widely used. Nor is there a genuine Dutch definition to the term.

⁶ Sabina Alkire. *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Working paper 2*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford (2003), p.21

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ John Kirton. *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, chapter 23, ed. Thomas Nelson ON, 2007, p.393

The Netherlands however are an active member of the Human Security Network (also known as the Lysøen Group). This group uses roughly the same definition as Canada. This is a consequence of the fact that this group was founded by Canada and Norway, where the term “human security” is defined in similar terms.¹⁰

Still it can be stated that the Dutch appreciation of human security, although not explicitly referred to, has led to Dutch participation in many PSOs, promotion of the “rule of law”, and Dutch attempts to discuss human rights in many state visits to many states like China, Russia, African countries and the Middle East where human rights are violated. The fact that institutions like the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are located in The Hague, can be seen as a symbol of the Dutch approach of international law as promoter and enforcer of human rights and human security in the sense of violence.

The Japanese approach

Japan maintains a much broader approach to human security, as this approach does not focus on “freedom from fear”, but also from “freedom from want”. Japan sees both perspectives as equally important. Sabine Alkire writes that “Japan emphasizes ‘Human Security’ from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity such as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel landmines”.¹¹

Japan thus defines the concept of human security from both the perspective of human inflicted violent threats as well as from the perspective of other factors, such as economy, health, and the environment.

¹⁰ Sabina Alkire. *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Working paper 2*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford (2003), p.21

¹¹ Ibid.

According to Alkire, “Japan’s [human security] emphasis has found leadership in the highest levels of government, and supports both development-related activities and peace-related activities”.¹²

The Japanese definition of human security resembles the UNDP definition to a fair extent as will be shown in the next chapter.

The UNDP approach

According to Alkire, the term ‘human security’ is most often associated with the definition given in the *1994 Human Development Report*, that was drafted by a team led by Mahtub ul Haq¹³. With his definition the UNDP aims to bridge the gap between the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. According to the report, human security has four essential characteristics:

- “Human security is a *universal* concern, [that is not bound to specific areas or nations]”;
- “The components of human security are *interdependent* [and not mutually exclusive]”;
- “*Early prevention* [is a far more effective way to ensure human security] than *later intervention*”;
- “Human security is [a] *people centric* [concern]”.¹⁴

These characteristics evolve into the following definition for human security in the 1994 Human Development Report:

- “1) Safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression.
- 2) Protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities”.¹⁵

The UNDP report approaches this definition from seven dimensions. Figure 1 gives a model in which the concept of human security is approached from these seven focus points. This model is inspired on the notion that the various dimensions are usually listed. Lists however often imply hierarchy, while in

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., p.13

¹⁴ UNDP. *Human Development Report*.1994, p.22

¹⁵ Sabina Alkire. *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Working paper 2*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford (2003), p.14

this case all dimensions are equally important to the concept of human security. Therefore the choice was made to create a circular model in which all dimensions are directly linked to the concept.




Figure 1: seven perspectives of human security¹⁶

Since these dimensions contain direct indicators that should be taken into account when an intelligence picture for PSOs is made, it is important to understand the definitions of these dimensions. Therefore a brief explanation follows below.

Personal security relates to security from physical violence. According to the 1994 Human Development Report, in both poor and rich nations human life is increasingly threatened by sudden and unpredictable violence. The report mentions several forms of threats, quoted below:¹⁷

- *Threats from the state (physical torture);*
- *Threats from other states (war);*

¹⁶ Self invented model

¹⁷ UNDP. *Human Development Report*.1994, p.30

- *Threats from other groups of people (ethnic tensions);*
- *Threats from individuals or gangs against other individuals or gangs (crime, street violence);*
- *Threats directed against women (rape, domestic violence);*
- *Threats directed to children based on their vulnerability and dependence (child abuse);*
- *Threats from self (suicide, drug use).*

Based on this definition, personal security is related to the freedom from fear dimension.

Community security relates to security from oppressive actions within a community. Particularly traditional communities can commit acts of oppression, such as slavery, particular harsh treatment of women, discrimination and disappearance of traditional languages and cultures.¹⁸ These practices can culminate to direct threats against personal security, for instance tribal wars or ethnic cleansing. Given the oppressive nature of these threats, the dimension of community security is related to the freedom from fear dimension.

Political security relates to security from state repression. The 1994 Human Development Report gives the following examples of state repression: political repression, political detention and imprisonment, systematic torture, disappearances, control of ideas and information.¹⁹ Given the violent character of these threats, political security is related to the freedom from fear dimension.

Economic security relates to an assured basic income for people.²⁰ Productive and remunerative work, or in the absence thereof a public financial safety provision, are the key requirements for the assurance of economic security. As the 1994 Human Development Report states, only 25% of the world population can be considered as being economically secure. Factors such as threatened employment induced by economic crises, shifts from manufacturing labour towards a knowledge based labour market, inflation, lack of full-time employment are threats to economic security. Often these threats are also divided unevenly within a community, since for instance unemployment rates among

¹⁸ Ibid., p.31, 32

¹⁹ Ibid., p.32, 33

²⁰ Ibid., p.25

immigrants are higher than among indigenous people.²¹ Economic security is directly related to the freedom from want dimension.

Health security relates to human life expectancy with regard to diseases and access to health care. The 1994 Human Development Report describes significant differences between developing nations and industrial nations. While, for instance, the major causes of death in developing countries are infectious and parasitic diseases, which are often linked to poor nutrition and an unsafe environment (particularly polluted water), the major death causes in industrial countries are diseases of the circulatory system, often linked to diet and lifestyle.²² A second killer in the industrial world is cancer, which is often linked to environmental factors, of which in the United States domestic pollution is the most significant one.²³

Another significant difference between developing and industrial countries is the maternal mortality rate and the death rate among women related to childbirth, which are significantly higher in developing countries than in industrial countries.²⁴

Even within industrial countries, the aforementioned differences are visible between rich and poor groups. These differences are mostly linked to differences in living and working conditions between those groups.²⁵

The final factor to be mentioned here is the difference in access to health care between industrial countries and developing countries. According to the 1994 Human Development Report, in the industrial countries there is an average of 1 doctor for 400 people, while in developing countries this average is 1 doctor for over 7,000 people. In the Sub-Saharan Africa rate is even more dramatic: 1

²¹ Ibid., p.25

²² Ibid., p.27

²³ Ibid., p.28

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

doctor for over 36,000 people.²⁶ This figure can be related to health spending, which is much lower in developing countries than in industrial countries. However here too, within industrial countries significant disparities between rich and poor groups can be seen. In poor groups one can see large numbers of people without health insurance,²⁷ a situation that deteriorates in times of economic crises.

Given the fact that factors, mentioned in the 1994 Human Development Report, are directly linked to the economic status of countries and groups, it can be concluded that this definition of health security is related to the freedom from want dimension.

Food security relates to physical and economic access to basic food. According to the 1994 Human Development Report, food availability is not a sufficient condition for food security. The UNDP states that the overall availability of food is not the problem. They state that there is enough food in the world to provide every living person with about 2,500 calories per day, which is 200 more than the required minimum²⁸. Also in developing countries, food production increased by 18% in the 1980s.²⁹

The key problem is that people do not have access to basic food, due to poor distribution and lack of purchasing power.³⁰ According to the 1994 Human Development Report, interventions of governments and international organizations have little effect to tackle this problem, since the root of the problem is access to assets, work and an assured income.³¹ Therefore food security is directly linked to the freedom from want dimension.

Environmental security relates to the conditions of the environment in general and effects of environmental disasters on human lives. Also here one can see significant differences between developing countries and industrial countries.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., p.27

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

In developing countries environmental insecurity is often caused by water scarcity and poor water quality due to poor sanitation. However the 1994 Human Development Report also states that many environmental problems are human induced, like desertification caused by deforestation, overgrazing and poor conservation methods.³² In industrial countries, air pollution is a key factor contributing to environmental insecurity, however this threat can also be seen in large cities in developing countries, like Mexico city.³³

Other environmental threats like salinization damage to irrigated lands, caused by salt residues which in turn are caused by extraction of water from these lands, can be seen in both developing and industrial countries.³⁴ These environmental threats are further increased by the continuous growth of the global world populace.

While the aforementioned threats have a chronic character, there are also threats from a more sudden and devastating nature. The 1994 Human Development Report mentions human induced disasters like Bhopal and Chernobyl as examples from human induced disasters.³⁵ However, also more chronic “natural” disasters like increasingly severe droughts and floods can be related to human behavior, like deforestation or overgrazing. Increased population of areas, prone to natural disasters like cyclones, floods, earthquakes, etc. along with poverty driving more people in more hazardous areas, are factors contributing to increased environmental insecurity.³⁶

Given the fact that many problems leading to environmental insecurity can be related to economic factors, it can be concluded that this environmental security is directly related to the freedom from want dimension.

³² Ibid., p.29

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

Conclusion

It must be concluded that the definition for the term “human security” is still contested. Since this paper focuses on the role of human security intelligence in PSOs, conducted by military forces, one could be tempted to revert to the physical violence scope of the term human security, which is totally focused on the freedom from fear dimension. Choosing this definition would be also in line with the fields of interest in classical military intelligence.

However, the present nature of conflicts shows that the Canadian definition may be too narrow, since this definition does not take the entire spectrum of the concept of Human Security into account and only focuses on the physical violence side of the spectrum. The UNDP definition would therefore be more appropriate. As the Japanese approach emphasizes, the dimensions freedom of fear and freedom from want are not mutually exclusive, but interdependent. Most armed conflicts find their root causes in the segments from the freedom from want dimension, for instance the division of scarce natural resources like water. On the other hand it is clear that armed conflicts in turn cause severe problems in the freedom from want dimension. The Canadian DND manual B-JG-005-307/FP-040 describes that: “prolonged conflict can lead to vulnerability in food, economic and health conditions.” Apart from decrease of access to traditional sources of income due to displacement of many people, damage to critical infrastructure like health care and sanitation have dramatic effects on the populace. Preventative health care breaks down, and health services get overstretched exactly when resources are in short supply.³⁷

The UNDP definition, laid down in the 1994 Human Development Report takes the Japanese definition one step further, by distinguishing seven well defined focal points within the freedom from fear and freedom from want dimensions. Given its practical and comprehensive nature, the UNDP definition of human security will be used as foundation for this paper.

³⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-307/FP-040, *Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005, p.1-2

CHAPTER 3 – TRENDS IN PSOs

A famous cliché states that “militaries always prepare for the last conflict”.³⁸ Bernd Horn contends that, despite the fact that this cliché is true, it is a ready source for critics.³⁹ Military leaders revert to their experience, lacking a clear insight in the nature of the future battle space. This is however not unique to military leaders, as this behaviour can also be seen in other professions. People always try to relate their actions to their experience and situations they are familiar with.

Since the end of the Cold War military leaders have been constantly challenged by a very dynamic international security environment and rapid changes in their areas of operations, forcing them to adapt their organizations and modus operandi accordingly. Key trends are: increased military engagement in crisis response,⁴⁰ a shift from symmetric to asymmetric warfare,⁴¹ increased focus on humanitarian aspects,⁴² “civilianization” of crisis response,⁴³ expansion of regional capacities,⁴⁴ new technological capabilities.⁴⁵

According to Horn, however, soldiers participating in intervention operations under these circumstances often complain that they were not prepared for the specific situation at hand. They were prepared along the lines of the most recent experience of the latest military operations.⁴⁶ One can thus state that they always tend to walk “one war behind”. Horn argues therefore that “it is important for militaries to prepare their leaders and soldiers to face the unknown, the ambiguous and the complex”,

³⁸ Bernd Horn. “From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment”, Chapter 9 in *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.193

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.7

⁴¹ Bernd Horn. “From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment”, Chapter 9 from *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.200

⁴² Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.1

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert. *Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killings*. Refugees International, Washington DC, July 2003, p.3

⁴⁶ Bernd Horn. “From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment”, Chapter 9 in *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.194

since these are the characteristics of the security operating environment of today and the future.⁴⁷ For the intelligence branches of the operational staffs of the intervention forces, this argument is even more true, since the intelligence community must expand its focus from aspects in the military domain towards aspects in the civilian domain as driving factor for operational planning. At the same there is a trend of increasing need for the intelligence community to cooperate with new partners. As will be shown later, intelligence therefore becomes much more complicated than it used to be.

This chapter discusses the trends in conflicts and their implications to crisis response operations in the post Cold War era and the increased focus on Human Security in the decision making process of whether or not to intervene.

Although the primary focus of this paper is on PSOs, some forceful intervention operations are taken into account as well, since after the initial intervention, participating forces find themselves in circumstances of similar complexity where similar lessons can be learnt.

The evolution of military interventions

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a dramatic change took place in the international security environment. As Horn states, the superpowers of the Cold War abandoned many of their proxy states, that they first subsidized or supported. As a consequence some of these states drifted towards their collapse resulting in a state of anarchy.⁴⁸ The voids in power structures were consequently filled by rogue leaders, warlords, militias, paramilitary gangs, and criminal organizations. This in turn led in many cases to armed conflicts and civil wars, which often threatened the overall stability in an entire region.⁴⁹ Instead of wars between states, these conflicts raged along ethnic and religious lines with an almost unimaginable brutality, resulting in grave humanitarian disasters.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.194

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.195

⁴⁹ Ibid.

With this changing security environment, patterns of military intervention changed as well. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union used their competitive military interventions to pursue their own national interests by expanding their areas of influence worldwide, securing economic resources and spreading their own ideologies. Parallel to these interventions, the United Nations started a few peacekeeping operations,⁵⁰ like the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) operations starting in 1964 and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) operation starting in 1978. (Both operations are still ongoing.) The Humanitarian Policy Group mentions that the number of UN peacekeeping operations until the late 1980s amounted to 13.⁵¹

The UN peacekeeping operations in the Cold War era were relatively simple. Horn gives a clear, although simplistic description of these operations:⁵² “The peacekeeper’s role was to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement once the fighting had stopped”. In most cases, the peacekeeping forces operated in clearly defined areas of responsibility (AORs), and with the consent of the belligerent parties. These AORs consisted of buffer zones between the belligerent parties, bordered by fortified lines behind which the belligerent parties remained. Belligerents were clearly identifiable by their national uniforms. The buffer zones were mostly uninhabited, so civilians were of no concern to the peacekeeping forces. The role of the UN Security Council was constrained by the tensions of the Cold War, which offered the UN Security Council few opportunities to make a difference.⁵³

The end of the Cold War marked a new era for peacekeeping operations. With the end of the competition between the two superpowers, new opportunities for international cooperation, different from the traditional Cold War partnerships emerged. The number of military interventions in crises increased dramatically. The Humanitarian Policy Group states that between 1988 and 1996, 29 new

⁵⁰ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.22

⁵¹ Bernd Horn. “From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment”, Chapter 9 in *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.194

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵³ Edward C. Luck, “Grading the Great Experiment”, from “UN Security Council Practice and Promise”, Routledge, New York, 2006, p.5

peacekeeping operations were initiated.⁵⁴ These peacekeeping operations were far more complex than the peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. The tasks of peacekeeping forces were expanded to disarming combatants, supporting the reconstruction of political institutions, and facilitating of elections,⁵⁵ like the UN operation in Cambodia in 1993.⁵⁶ As a consequence of this increased complexity, the scale of these new peacekeeping operations was much larger than in the Cold War era.⁵⁷

In the 1990s a new development emerged, since military interventions were no longer limited to interstate conflicts. Forceful interventions now also took place in intrastate conflicts and human security, although in the beginning not explicitly mentioned, became a key driving factor for decisions to intervene. The Humanitarian Policy Group mentions some examples: Iraqi Kurdistan (1991), Somalia (1992-1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1992), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000).⁵⁸ According to the Humanitarian Policy Group these interventions were however controversial. Firstly, these missions were forceful interventions in the internal affairs of the states concerned, which meant a breach of their respective sovereignty. Secondly, these missions were not executed under the flag of the United Nations, but by ad hoc coalitions of states, regional organizations (the NATO led IFOR operation in Bosnia and the NATO led air war and subsequent KFOR operation in Kosovo), or even single countries (UK in Sierra Leone). In most cases Western states, like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia or France, were the central drivers behind these operations.⁵⁹ Although not undertaken by the UN, most of these intervention operations were approved by the UN Security Council. Luck explains this phenomenon by stating that “successive secretaries-general [...] have asserted that the UN is not capable of organizing and overseeing military

⁵⁴ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.22

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ [http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter 8/ASIA/item 15 Cambodia .pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/ASIA/item%2015%20Cambodia%20.pdf) (accessed March 2011)

⁵⁷ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.22

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

enforcement measures, which must be left to coalitions of the willing”, preferably in regional coalitions.⁶⁰

The relevance of the UN as an active international player, was strikingly proven by the priority given by the Bush administration to getting the Security Council on board, both before as well as after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.⁶¹ But the outcome is debatable, given the refusal of the Security Council to approve this intervention and the subsequent decision of the United States to conduct the Iraqi Freedom operation despite the Security Council’s decision. The refusal of major allies of the United States, like Canada and Germany to participate in this operation, as well as the popular opposition within the countries that did participate, were clear evidence of the new public perceptions and international norms towards sources of legitimacy and the use of force. Multilateralism has become the expected norm in international relations and unilateral actions are considered inappropriate. On the other hand, as Luck states “the Council’s boosters [...] should beware that public expectations concerning the Council’s performance may well be rising with its increasing activism”.⁶² These expectations may sometimes lead to disappointment or skepticism.

An important factor to be highlighted here is the change in attitude within the UN towards state sovereignty. Prior to the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the opinion ruled that every state was sovereign in the way it governed within its borders and that foreign influence and intervention were inappropriate. However after the Rwanda massacre, the international community, including the UN, state that every state has the obligation to protect its people against violence. If a country is not able or willing to protect its people, other states and organizations have the right to intervene.⁶³ This right is made explicit in the so-called “Responsibility to Protect”.

⁶⁰ Edward C. Luck. “Grading the Great Experiment”, in *UN Security Council Practice and Promise*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p.7

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.5

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert. *Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killings*. Refugees International, Washington DC, July 2003, p.7

The Responsibility to Protect

In September 2005, the Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the UN was agreed upon on by heads of state and government of the member states.

Paragraphs 138 and 139 of his document contained the following text on the Responsibility to Protect:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.⁶⁴

With this formulation of Responsibility to Protect for the United Nations formally recognized the fact that today's conflicts take place along ethnical or religious lines, that do not necessarily represent state borders. States have the responsibility to protect the security of all people within their borders. In case a state fails to protect its people or certain groups of people like minorities against threats like crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing or other threats to their dignity, the sovereignty of that state may be sacrificed by the international community in order to intervene.

Due to the Responsibility to Protect, one can expect a further increase in the number of military interventions in intrastate conflicts. A clear example is the decision of the UN Security Council to

⁶⁴ United Nations General Assembly. *2005 World Summit Outcome*, Document A/60/L.1. United Nations, New York, 15 September 2005, p.31

establish a no-fly zone over Libya in March 2011 to prevent the bombing of Libyan civil targets by the Khadafy regime.

It should however be borne in mind that the Responsibility to Protect in this formulation focuses on the freedom from fear dimension of the spectrum. As stated in the previous chapter, many indicators in the freedom from want dimension can be used as early warnings to predict potential armed conflicts. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty does however believe that the Responsibility to Protect implies an inherent Responsibility to Prevent, which focuses on addressing these early warning indicators as a means to prevent physical threats to human dignity and subsequently the necessity of forceful intervention.⁶⁵

The evolution of PSOs

In today's PSOs, military forces are confronted with new concerns in comparison to traditional peacekeeping operations. As stated in the previous section, traditional peacekeeping operations took place in a predefined AOR, mostly consisting a buffer or demarcation zone between belligerent parties who had retreated behind fortified lines and all agreed to the presence of the peacekeeping forces. The AOR was mostly uninhabited, due to evacuations of the civil populace. Human security in the AOR was therefore of little issue.

In the 1990's the so-called complex peacekeeping operations became the standard since experience had learned that although the belligerent parties had agreed to a ceasefire and the presence of the peacekeeping force, the agreements were often breached. These complex peacekeeping operations differed from the traditional peacekeeping operations because of often less restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) in order to stop combat, a larger force capable to respond with combat operations

⁶⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa, December 2001, p.19-21

in order to coerce if necessary, and human security issues in the AOR. In complex peacekeeping operations, the peacekeeping forces were deployed countrywide.⁶⁶

The consent of all belligerent parties, although an important requisite, is no longer a factor that can block an intervention when circumstances demand a forceful intervention in order to enforce a resolution, to re-establish the provision of humanitarian aid or simply to protect the civilian populace,⁶⁷ as such providing a higher degree of human security.

The so-called 'War on Terror', as well as the objective to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and so-called 'rogue' states' have caused US initiated intervention operations in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003,⁶⁸ the latter being heavily disputed as already explained in the previous chapter. Given the reasons why these operations were started (often to create a regime change) and the rules that apply, these operations must be seen as a different category than PSOs. Be it as it may, small countries like the Netherlands are involved in these interventions as well, while after the initial intervention these forces now find themselves in circumstances of similar complexity as modern PSOs where dire lessons are being learnt for future operations.

State building is recognized as another objective of today's PSOs⁶⁹ where the focus is laid on the establishment of a governance apparatus, physical security structures, and other structures in the human security domain.

During the last decade new terms were introduced to describe PSOs. There is a distinction between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacemaking missions. Today's missions do no longer take

⁶⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, *Peace Support Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002, p.5-8

⁶⁷ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.22

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.23

⁶⁹ John A. Lynn, Ph.D. "Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency", *Military Review*, July-August 2005, p.22

place in the confined buffer zones, and in more varying levels of violence as well.⁷⁰ Today's military operations therefore are conducted in both populated and rural areas. In order to describe the complexity of modern intervention operations, in the early 1990's, USMC Commandant General Charles C. Krulak introduced the term "Three Block War". Given the volatile and fast changing chaotic environment in the operational area, according to this term military forces must be able to switch between humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and traditional warfighting "within the space of three contiguous city blocks".⁷¹

Former USMC LtCol William S. Lind et al. introduced the term Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) for this kind of warfare.⁷² 4GW means a significant break from traditional warfare. In the traditional paradigm of warfare, only states had the monopoly of warfare, while in 4GW the opposing forces consists of the non-nation-states and their people. The concept of combatants differs from the traditional paradigm and does not readily fit in the tradition laws of armed conflict, given the aforementioned inability to distinguish fighters from civilians.⁷³ A related problem can be observed in Africa, where children are being abducted from their families to become child soldiers, which in turn can pose dramatic ethical and practical challenges to intervention forces.⁷⁴

Factors influencing PSOs

This section describes four key factors that influence PSOs. These factors do on one hand complicate matters in the mission areas, due to which intelligence is a far more complicated effort than in traditional PSOs. Some factors can be seen as double edged swords: they complicate the mission environment, but as will be shown later in this paper, they provide valuable opportunities as well for the intelligence community.

⁷⁰ Bernd Horn. "From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment", Chapter 9 from *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.195

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.198

⁷² William S. Lind, Col Keith Nightengale (USA), Capt John F. Scmitt (USMC), Col Joseph W. Sutton (USA), LtCol Gary I. Wilson (USMCR). "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, p.22-26

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.200

⁷⁴ Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert. *Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killings*. Refugees International, Washington DC, July 2003, p.7

The first factor is the transition of the mode of conduct in armed conflicts from symmetric to asymmetric warfare. In traditional warfare and traditional peacekeeping operations, the belligerent were clearly distinguishable by their national uniforms. The mode of conduct in these conflict was symmetric warfare. However today's conflicts are very often asymmetric, in which intervention forces are confronted with an invisible enemy consisting of opposing forces who cannot be distinguished by a uniform. Insurgents operate between the local populace, thus posing an invisible threat to both the security of the intervention forces as well as for the populace, who are often victims in military responses by the intervention forces. According to Horn, asymmetry is not aimed at obtaining battlefield victory, but at the disruption, distraction and disconnection of the intervention force.⁷⁵ Often groups that are driven out of power by an intervention force revert to an insurgency modus operandi against the intervention force.

Insurgencies can take various forms, varying from terrorism to guerrilla war and even conventional warfare.⁷⁶ Terrorism is mostly aimed against unarmed non-combatants, often civilians in order to bring fear among the populace in pursuit of political objectives. Guerrilla warfare, however is aimed against opposing military forces, mostly by small highly mobile hit-and-run units, with the goal to gradually break the will of the opposing military forces.

The second factor is the emergence of the good will of local populace as center of gravity in modern PSOs.⁷⁷ This good will is based on the perceived legitimacy of the intervention force. Actions deemed inappropriate by the local populace, collateral damage, civilian casualties or other factors can rapidly erode this perceived legitimacy.⁷⁸ Given the fact that many military actions take place in between the local populace, close liaison with the populace and local civilian agencies is necessary. Addressing problems and threats in the freedom from want dimensions of the human security spectrum is a

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.200

⁷⁶ Brad E. O'Neill, "The Nature of Insurgency" in *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd edition, Washington DC, Potomac books, 2005, p.32

⁷⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, *Peace Support Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002, p.5-8

⁷⁸ Ibid.

powerful instrument to persuade the local populace to choose the side of the intervention force instead of opposing forces like insurgents. The local populace thus be more willing to cooperate with the intervention force and serve as a valuable source of information as will be shown later in this paper.

In most Western countries, public support to active participation in PSOs, can easily vanish when they suffer too many casualties. This leads to the problem that military commanders must balance the protection of the local populace in their AOR with sufficient force protection. Force protection can however lead to an eroding perception of legitimacy from the perspective of the local populace which for the intelligence community leads to the loss of a valuable source of information.

The third factor in the AOR of an intervention force is the presence of many civilian organizations, like International Organizations (e.g. UN bodies), inter-governmental organizations, international organizations (e.g. the ICRC) and non-governmental organizations.⁷⁹ Since unity of effort between all these agencies and the intervention force is a key success factor for intervention operations, coordination and negotiation are extremely important activities⁸⁰ since these civilian organizations are very valuable information sources for intelligence gathering as well.

The fourth to is the ongoing privatization of the security sector, both domestically as well as in the overseas operations areas. Benjamin Perrin estimates the private military and security industry to have a total market worth of US\$ 210 billion in 2010.⁸¹ Their clients range from states to IO's and NGO's, who contract specific tasks like the protection of compounds, buildings, convoys and personnel⁸². Also local authorities in the operations areas often hire PSC's for their own protection. In the industrialized world, PSC's are made up by a significant amount of personnel with a SOF background.⁸³ However

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.1-2

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.2-2

⁸¹ Benjamin Perrin. "Guns for Hire – with Canadian Taxpayer Dollars" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.5

⁸² Christopher Spearin. "What Manley Missed: the Human Security Implications of Private Security in Afghanistan" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.8

⁸³ Christopher Spearin. "SOF for Sale: the Canadian Forces and the Challenge of Privatized Security", Chapter 10 in *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.232

also in the operations areas many PSC's have been established, consisting of local personnel. Spearin estimates that in Afghanistan some 90 PCS's are active, consisting of some 20.000 Afghan personnel⁸⁴. Although PSC's provide valuable contributions by filling gaps, that cannot be filled by the thinly stretched intervention force, conducting their specific operations,⁸⁵ they also pose a number of challenges and sometimes give rise to serious debate.

One problem posed by PSC's is their attractiveness to SOF personnel, which causes a personnel drain for SOF forces,⁸⁶ just when SOF forces play an increasingly important role in humanitarian interventions, given their surgically precise actions resulting in absolute minimum collateral damage. As stated before, minimization of collateral damage is key to the perceived legitimacy of the intervention operation for the local populace, which in turn is one of the centers of gravity.

Another potential problem posed by the privatization of the security sector is how the proper conduct of PSC's can be assured, for instance with regard to the use of force.⁸⁷ The Blackwater affair of 2007 in Iraq was a clear example of problems that may arise when these safeguards are not properly established. Misconduct of PSC's do have serious effects on the reputation of the parties who hired them.⁸⁸ Perrin mentions another incident where these checks and balances were poorly implemented: an investigation found a former British soldier, who was jailed before for working with Irish terrorists, was working for a PSC in Iraq. A former South African soldier was found in Iraq as well, working for a PSC, while he had admitted to have firebombed over 60 houses of political activists during the Apartheid regime.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Christopher Spearin. "What Manley Missed: the Human Security Implications of Private Security in Afghanistan" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.8

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Benjamin Perrin, "Guns for Hire – with Canadian Taxpayer Dollars" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.6

⁸⁸ James Cockayne. "After Blackwatergate – How Humanitarians Can Help Professionalize the Global Security Industry" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.12

⁸⁹ Benjamin Perrin. "Guns for Hire – with Canadian Taxpayer Dollars" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.6

The Canadian Consortium on Human Security admits that PSC's cannot be removed from today's intervention operations, like Afghanistan.⁹⁰ However, a number of recommendations are made by this consortium to regulate the use and conduct of PSC's. Perrin for instance suggests a number of preventative approaches, like obtaining information on past human security conduct of PSC's before hiring them and training of PSC's with regard to international humanitarian law and human rights, posing requirements on PSC's to comply to local law.⁹¹ He also suggests some reactive approaches, such as investigation and prosecution of alleged misconduct, contract termination or reporting of violations to authorities.⁹² Further, Perrin suggests that it should be considered to question whether it would be better to bring contracted tasks back to the armed forces.⁹³ Spearin recommends to ensure that salaries for the security sector must be fair and competitive to salaries given by PSC's.⁹⁴ Like Perrin, Spearin too urges for regulation of the PSC sector.⁹⁵ Spearin suggests that efforts should aim at regulation and reduction of the number of PSC's, also by training local forces like ANA and ANP in Afghanistan.⁹⁶ Doug Brooks and Shawn Lee Rathgeber also state that not only hiring entities like nation states or NGO's are important factors, but that the PSC industry sector itself has an important role to play in regulating the PSC market for instance by formulating codes of conduct.⁹⁷

Despite the aforementioned problems PSC's can play important non-combat roles in PSOs. The Humanitarian Policy Group mentions military consulting firms that consist of retired senior and non-commissioned officers who give military training and advice, and military support firms that deliver services like logistics, intelligence and maintenance.⁹⁸ These firms often fill gaps that cannot be filled by the intervention force and, when used in the right manner, deliver valuable services.

⁹⁰ Christopher Spearin, "What Manley Missed: the Human Security Implications of Private Security in Afghanistan" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.8

⁹¹ Benjamin Perrin. "Guns for Hire – with Canadian Taxpayer Dollars" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.6

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., p.9

⁹⁴ Christopher Spearin. "What Manley Missed: the Human Security Implications of Private Security in Afghanistan" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.10

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Doug Brooks and Shawn Lee Rathgeber. "The Industry Role in Regulating Private Security Companies" in *Human Security Bulletin* vol. 6, Issue 3, March 2008, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, p.18

⁹⁸ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.68

CHAPTER 4 – NEW APPROACHES TO PSOS

The changed environment of the last decade in which PSOs take place and the increased focus on human security as a driving factor for PSOs has led to the development of new concepts for the conduct of PSOs. Where classical peacekeeping operations mainly focus on monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements, where belligerent parties were separated by the peacekeeping forces, modern PSOs, while taking place between the populace in the mission area have their focus more on sustainable stabilization. Leaders of today's PSOs recognize the fact that conflicts often are caused by other than just military or political factors. Referring to the UNDP model of the concept of human security, this means that many problems in the freedom from fear dimension are caused by problems in the freedom from want dimension. Therefore many nations, contributing to PSOs, develop operational concepts in which not only the freedom from fear, but also the freedom from want side of the spectrum are addressed. In the next pages two models are described. The first model is the Dutch 3D approach as modus operandi in the military operation itself. The second model is the Canadian Whole of Government approach as a driver for not only the military operation, but even as a driver for foreign policy. The Dutch government, in recognition of the limitations of the 3D approach is currently developing a new operations model, which is called the "Comprehensive Approach". Since this term is also widely used and, just like the term "human security" has many definitions, the Dutch focus will be further explained.

The Dutch 3D-approach in the Uruzgan province

Since 2006, the Netherlands, have adopted the so-called 3D approach as modus operandi in Afghanistan⁹⁹ as an answer to the classic military approach that purely focused on physical security rather than the full width of human security.

⁹⁹ Mirjam Grandia. "The 3D Approach and Counter Insurgency; A mix of Defence, Diplomacy and Development; the Case of Uruzgan". Master thesis for the University of Leiden, June 2009, p.13

The 3D approach is not new, since its origins lay in the Vietnam war, when the United States government requested the RAND corporation to assist in developing sophisticated COIN methods.¹⁰⁰ This initiative led to the so-called Hearts-and-Minds (HAM) theory. According to this theory, the first concern is to protect the populace from physical violence, in this case insurgency. This is done by firstly offering protection by intervention forces, and secondly by helping the government to build a proper security sector. The second concern is the improvement of the governance sector, by addressing problems such as the rule of law, absence of administration or poor state of administration, ethnic or religious community problems and corruption. The third concern is to enhance the economic situation in order to persuade the populace to choose the side of the government instead of the insurgency.¹⁰¹

Although the 3D concept has been adopted by many western countries as their modus operandi for humanitarian and military interventions, one cannot say that there is one single approach. Each country has its own approach. For instance, the United States have a very defence-centric COIN approach. The Dutch approach aimed at attaining a balance between Defence, Diplomacy and Development, which was readily reflected in the organization of the Dutch/Australian Task Force Uruzgan. Figure 2 shows how the Task Force Uruzgan was organized in terms of organizational components and how key positions were filled in by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch Ministry of International Development.




Figure 2: Organization chart of Task Force Uruzgan

The key elements within the Task Force Uruzgan for the direct provision of security to the populace were the Dutch Battle Group, the Engineers (containing a explosives demolition platoon), the Australian Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF). Special forces and air support were

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.14

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

under direct control from Regional Command South. Security Sector Reform was the key responsibility of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison team. The main task within this responsibility was training the Afghan National Army (ANA).

Development was the key responsibility of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team, however the Australian MRTF accounted for the development of areas, under their control as well.

The organization chart in Figure 2 does not show a direct relation with the diplomacy dimension in the 3D approach. This dimension, however was of major importance in the Dutch 3D approach. The Dutch government decided to augment the commanders position with a Civil Representative (CIVREP), who was placed at the same level of the Task Force commander. A deputy CIVREP was placed beside the deputy commander. Both the CIVREP and deputy CIVREP came from the diplomatic services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The personal staff of the CIVREP consisted of a Development Advisor (DEVAD), a Cultural Advisor (CULAD), and a Political Advisor (POLAD). The DEVAD originated from the Dutch Ministry of International Development, while the POLAD and CULAD were drawn from the Leiden University, where they normally work for the department of International Studies.

In the initial stages, the Task Force Commander was practically in the lead of the entire operation, with the CIVREP in a “secondary” command role, since the operation at that time aimed at stabilizing the environment in terms of physical security. When the operation continued, the accent of the operation gradually moved to stabilization and reconstruction of the civil environment, which led to the situation in which the CIVREP was practically the primary leader of the operation, with the military Task Force commander in a more secondary role.

The Deputy CIVREP was in close contact with the PRT commander. He also maintained close connections with other agencies in the Uruzgan province, like USAID, the US Police Monitoring

Team, Dyncorp, the Poppy Eradication Force, US POLAD and Australian Liaison Officer.¹⁰² Figure 3 shows the organization chart of the CIVREP and PRT command and communication lines.




Figure 3: PRT and CIVREP organization chart

The Dutch 3D approach was hailed by other countries, like the United States,¹⁰³ and also by several groups in the Uruzgan province, like the Tokhi and Barakzai tribes, who were initially marginalized by the US forces, who saw them as exponents of the Taliban.¹⁰⁴ According to The Liaison Office (an Afghan NGO), the Dutch forces were seen as seriously avoiding civilian casualties and very sensitive to local customs and culture.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, the Dutch approach was also seen as “indecisive and less forceful than US or Australian forces”,¹⁰⁶ since the Dutch approach was based on extensive dialogue. Also the Dutch development efforts were less visible, since many development projects, although financed by the Dutch government, were outsourced to local companies and NGO’s and even Australian forces who engaged in development projects much more actively than the Dutch.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² Ibid., p.74

¹⁰³ <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124105482098871505.html>; Wall Street Journal, May 4th 2009. (Accessed April 2011)

¹⁰⁴ The Liaison Office. *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010; a TLO Socio-Political Assessment*, Kandahar, August 2010, p.IX.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.51

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

LTC W.L. Rietdijk, a former Dutch PRT commander, however uncovers a major handicap of the Dutch approach: a missing strategy and missing “pragmatic and achievable” goals.¹⁰⁸ The Dutch government commits itself for a mission for a fixed period. For the Uruzgan mission, the Dutch commitment was initially given for a two years time span,¹⁰⁹ which was later extended with another two years. However for this mission no political or military end state was defined in the Dutch parliament, other than a long term goal in which “the increased ability of the Afghan government to take responsibility for security, governance and reconstruction”.¹¹⁰ In 2010 the mission ended with the fall of the Dutch cabinet. The Dutch withdrawal led to fears among many groups like the Barakzai and Tokhi tribes, who feared a tribal shift in favour of the Popolzai,¹¹¹ certainly since the Dutch were succeeded by the US forces, whose perceptions among the Afghan populace continues to be far less favourable.¹¹² Lacking a clear and realistic definition for an end state, the Afghan fear of a decline in terms of security, political stability and loss of the achieved improvements in many fields in the Uruzgan society, due to which the region falls back into extremism, must be considered real.

The Canadian Whole of Government approach

Where the 3D approach became the modus operandi for Dutch military intervention operations since 2006, it must be said that the Canadian reaches further. The policies of departments that were involved in the international environment, like the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)¹¹³ have been integrated for Canada’s foreign policy as a whole. This approach has stems from two rationales. The first rationale is to achieve unity of effort and thus to avoid duplication of activities and unwanted interference between various departments. The second motive is the

¹⁰⁸ LTC, W.L. Rietdijk, Royal Netherlands Army. “The comprehensive approach in Uruzgan: playing four chess matches simultaneously” in *Military Spectator* nr. 9, September 2010, p. 472. (translated)

¹⁰⁹ Netherlands Ministry of Defence, *Parliamentary letter 2007-11-30* on the extension of Dutch mission in Uruzgan (Translation), Dutch Government, the Hague, september 2007, p.2

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.16

¹¹¹ The Liaison Office. *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010; a TLO Socio-Political Assessment*, Kandahar, August 2010, p.53

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p.52

¹¹³ Stephen Brown. “CIDA under the Gun”, Chapter 5 from *Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room For Manoeuvre*, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, Montreal, Quebec, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008, p.94

recognition that security is needed for development, while development is needed for sustained security.¹¹⁴

The Whole of Government approach was the basis for the Canadian government's "International Policy Statement" of 2005. DFAIT was given the coordinating role for integrated foreign policy development and execution, including interventions in "failing or failed states" and reconstruction of crisis torn states.¹¹⁵ In this approach DND and CIDA can thus be considered to be subordinate to DFAIT.

The introduction of the Whole of Government approach went hand in hand with a major increase in budget for Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) from CAN\$ 2.6 billion in 2000-01 to CAN\$ 4.1 billion in 2004-05.¹¹⁶ Although this increased budget increased the possibilities of CIDA to improve its work both externally in its international development activities as well as internally. However, unlike the Dutch situation where the three ministries play a separate role and still act independently from each other, Brown contends that the larger budgets committed to CIDA came at the expense of CIDA's autonomy. Brown makes this very clear by stating: "CIDA can [...] sit at the table with bigger players (mainly DND and DFAIT) and have its development agenda overridden by Canadian self-interest, or it can try to insulate itself from outside influence, risking in the process a dramatic decrease in the resources it is allocated".¹¹⁷

Another difference on the international aid agenda between the Canadian and Dutch approaches is the budget given to international aid. In Canada, the budget allocated to international aid depends on the government in power at the moment,¹¹⁸ while in the Netherlands a fixed budget of 0.7% of the GNP is

¹¹⁴ John Baker. *Quick Impact Projects: Towards a 'whole of government' approach*. Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Paterson Review, 2007 Vol. 8, p.2

¹¹⁵ Stephen Brown. "CIDA under the Gun", Chapter 5 in *Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre*, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, Montreal, Quebec, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008, p.94

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.91

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.101

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.103

allocated annually to international development.¹¹⁹ Given the fact that Afghanistan was just one of the countries supported by the Ministry of International Development, this policy had limited effect to the Task Force Uruzgan.

The effects of the Canadian Whole of Government approach is very well illustrated in the policy of Foreign Minister Peter McKay, who in 2007 called the Afghanistan mission “the number one priority of the Government of Canada in its foreign policy”.¹²⁰ This approach resulted in the fact that CIDA had to make hard choices on where to continue international aid and where to discontinue development aid, like in Bangladesh. In this case DFAIT’s premium on international affairs was clearly demonstrated, since Afghanistan became the largest recipient of Canadian ODA.

However with DFAIT politically in charge, in the case of Afghanistan, DND remains the leading actor on the ground. In areas like Kandahar, where because of the constant Taliban threat the emphasis still must be laid on physical security, development activities can only be conducted on a limited scale. For CIDA this meant that in 2007 was unable to spend the budget allocated for Afghanistan in the planned timeframe, due to which huge sums were turned over to different agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and various agencies linked to the UN.¹²¹ Similar to the Netherlands, discussions take place in the Canadian political arena whether or not the CIDA budgets allocated to Afghanistan, should be transferred to DND, given the fact that DND executes most development projects in the field. And in both Canada and the Netherlands this idea is met with skepticism, since this idea would jeopardize the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, given the risk that this assistance would then be used directly in support of military objectives, turning other agencies into targets for the insurgents.¹²² On the other hand, the Canadian operation in Kandahar also hears the criticism that DND is already placed at the premium in theatre, leading to adverse effects to the development and diplomatic efforts in the region. The Canadian Council for International Co-Operation (CCIC) even

¹¹⁹ Government of the Netherlands, article D1 of *Rijksbegroting 2011, Vaststelling begroting Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken* (State Budget 2011, Definition budget Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dutch Government, the Hague, 2011.

¹²⁰ Stephen Brown. “CIDA under the Gun”, Chapter 5 in *Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre*, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, Montreal, Quebec, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008, p.94

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p.96

¹²² *Ibid.*

declares that “integrated Whole of Government Approach has served to militarize peace-building and humanitarian and development assistance”.¹²³

The conclusion can be drawn that the Canadian Whole of Government approach is a possible next step for the Dutch 3D approach, since the Canadian approach strives for unity of effort for the entire international policy agenda of Canada, while in the Netherlands the 3D approach was limited to the modus operandi of intervention operations. In other situations, the three involved ministries in the Netherlands have their own independent agenda's. With the new cabinet in power in the Netherlands, the choice was made to integrate the Ministry of International Development into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while at the same time placing more premium on Dutch national interests on the financing of international development.¹²⁴ However the Canadian Whole of Government approach has its limitations as well, and the approach needs further development in order to create a proper balance between the three dimensions of defence, development and diplomacy.

The new Dutch Comprehensive Approach Staff Concept

At this moment, a new staff concept for intervention operations is currently under development by the Dutch Ministry of Defence, assisted by the Dutch TNO organization (Netherlands Organization of Applied Scientific Research). The new staff concept is based on the experience gained during various peacekeeping and intervention operations in which the Dutch armed forces participated including of course the mission in the Uruzgan province in Afghanistan and therefore relevant since it provides some valuable possibilities for enhancing the alignment of the military and civil actors in the area of interest (AOI), both in the execution of the operations as well as in understanding the operational environment in terms of human security. This chapter gives an outline of the new staff concept, published in preliminary concept by the Dutch Ministry of Defence.¹²⁵

¹²³ CCIC. *Canada's Whole of Government Approach in Afghanistan: Implications on Development and Peace-building*, Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty CCIC, Briefing Paper: submission to the independent panel on Afghanistan, November 2007, p. 1

¹²⁴ <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/hervorming-ontwikkelingssamenwerking> (accessed April 2011)

¹²⁵ Netherlands Ministry of Defence. *Operational Staff Concept*, preliminary version

The currently used staff concept is still based on the NATO standard J1-J9 sections structure. This structure was established to create an optimal alignment of activities in a military staff in the operational planning process. However, according to the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, this structure has also led to a functional stovepipe structure, in which the focus was primarily laid on kinetic operations.¹²⁶

The increased complexity of current intervention operations, already described in this paper, along with factors such as the development of so-called effects based approaches, the tremendous increase of information flows around and within military staffs and the development of new technological capabilities have led that also in NATO a trend can be seen in which alternatives to the traditional J1-J9 structure are experimented with.¹²⁷

The new staff concept is based on two pillars: structure and culture. The new staff structure is based on what is assumed to be the current operational situation, in which the described Joint, Combined and multi-agency nature of today's operational environment, while it is aimed at offering the commander the necessary flexibility to deal effectively with the ever increasing amounts of information within the operational staff. The new staff concept further aims to create a change in military culture in which information is seen as a weapon system in its own right.¹²⁸ In an information management cell meeting at the ISAF RC-South headquarters in September 2009, the British colonel Bruce put it this way: "Information is the ultimate weapon in a military staff. If this weapon fails, the entire operation will fail, since we send units blindfolded into the field without the information they so critically need to do their things".¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.1

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.2

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Personal observation of the author of this paper, who was present at this meeting in his role of Information Manager of the G2 branch of the Dutch/Australian Task Force Uruzgan

For the development of the new staff structure, 6 main processes were distinguished:¹³⁰

- Intelligence: initiation, collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding the operational environment, thus providing a comprehensive situational awareness to key decision makers within the staff;
- Mission design & assessment: development of mission design and assessment of missions in order to advise and support key decision makers for the longer term;
- Operations planning: Development of concrete operations plans, based on the mission design, in which tasks of the staff itself as well as the subunits (for instance PRT's, Battle Groups etc) are described;
- Support: continuous optimization of the application and monitoring of capacities concerning personnel and materiel logistics for current and future operations;
- Current operations: continuous creation of proper conditions for and monitoring of current operations, in order to ensure that current operations are carried out and can be adjusted in accordance to the commanders intent;
- Staff coordination and information management: coordination of the entire staff processes and management of information throughout the staff to ensure that the right information gets to the right person at the right time and in the right format, in order to maximize information value and optimize the entire command and control process.
- Facilities management: Support to the entire operation in terms of housing, internal logistics support, catering, etc.

TNO depicted the various resulting process architecture of the command staff as follows:

¹³⁰ Working Group CPConcept. *Report Staff Concept, version 25-9-2009*, Netherlands Ministry of Defence and TNO, 2009, p.4




Figure 4: Process architecture of new staff concept¹³¹

Based on this process model a new staff organization structure has been designed. In order to show the premium of information in the staff process, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and TNO chose to depict the organization in the manner of Figure 6:

¹³¹ Netherlands Ministry of Defence, *Operational Staff Concept*, preliminary version




Figure 5: New concept staff structure

The command element consists of the Commander (COM), the Deputy Commander (DCOM), the Chief of Staff (COS), the Command Sergeant Major (CSM). The COM has command over the entire operation, while in this concept the COS is responsible for leading the staff. Therefore, in Figure 5, the COS is presented in the center of the staff, while the COM is presented outside the central staff circle. The command element also contains a Civil Representative (CIVREP) who will be placed as equal counterpart of the COM. The CIVREP is drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Depending on the operation at hand or the status of a given operation, the COM or the CIVREP is in charge of the entire operation, with his counterpart in a supporting role. The team can also be augmented as necessary with military and civil advisors (such as the Political Advisor, Cultural Advisor, Legal Advisor, Development Advisor etc.).

The various cells within the staff organization are responsible for the following processes:

- Mission Environment Cell: Intelligence process
- Mission Planning & Assessment Cell: Mission Design & Assessment process
- Plans Cell: Operations Planning process
- Current Ops Cell: Current Operations process
- Mission Support Cell: Support process
- Information Management Cell: overall Information Management process
- Staff Support Unit : Facilities Management process.¹³²

In this organization model, the chiefs of the various cells are responsible for the information management within their own cells. The Information Management cell concentrates on optimizing the information exchange between the cells. Therefore this cell is drawn around the other cells. This again shows the perceived importance of information in the entire staff process.

In the same sense, the Staff Support unit is responsible for facilities management for the entire staff, including the COM. Therefore in this model the Staff Support unit is drawn around the entire staff.

In this model all cells are organized on the same concept. The Cell Chief, who is still a military chief, heads a permanent staff executing the process for which the cell is responsible. The cell can be augmented by ad hoc civilian and military personnel, who possess a certain knowledge or the background needed for the situation at hand.¹³³ In summary the cell organization structure is as follows:




Figure 6: Organizational cell structure

¹³² Ibid., p.9

¹³³ Ibid., p.10

The rationale behind adding civilian augmentees to the various cells is to give civilian agencies and authorities, like NGO's, local governance, local police and others active in the area of operations an active role in the entire planning process in order to achieve unity of effort in the stabilization and reconstruction of the area. Within the Mission Planning & Assessment cell, for instance, these civilian agencies can add their insights in the longer term mission objectives, while in the Plans cell civilian agencies have a voice so that military operations and civilian activities are better orchestrated. Within the Mission Environment Cell, the civilian agencies can add information from their respective background into the Common Operational Picture that thus becomes much more focused on the various aspects of human security.

With this staff concept the Dutch Ministry of Defence thus aims to take the 3D concept to a next level, where not only the Dutch Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Aid are involved. Instead all the key players who are active in the Area of Operations have a voice in the entire planning process, thus achieving unity of effort between all the key players. This is where this model differs from the Canadian Whole of Government approach as well, since that approach is also entirely structured around governmental departments.

CHAPTER 5 – THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

The operational concepts for PSOs presented in the previous chapter can be seen as attempts to cope with the increased complexity of the operational environment in which these operations are conducted. One of the greatest challenges in these operations is to get a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment without getting overwhelmed with detail. Various intelligence models are currently being used by the contributing forces.

Following the causal framework below, the variables determining human security in the freedom from want dimension of the UNDP model, are directly related to the variables in the freedom from fear dimension.




Figure 7: Causal pathways of human security¹³⁴

Given this direct relationship it is the task of the intelligence community to gather and analyze information on all these variables, in order to provide the operational planning process with a comprehensive operational picture. In the mission approaches, presented in the previous chapters, the planning process is based on this operational picture, while addressing the various dimensions.

¹³⁴ Figure 7 is based on: Pauline Kerr, figure 6.1 of "Human Security", chapter 6 in *Contemporary Security Studies* ed. Alan Collins, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.99

This chapter shortly analyzes the most frequently used intelligence models in current PSOs. The question here is whether these models suffice to analyze the human security situation in an AOI as an indicator of the effectiveness of the operation. As will be shown in this analysis, these models were developed from the perspective of influencing opposing forces or regimes, rather than finding and addressing the root causes of current crises. As an alternative to these models a self-inspired human intelligence model is presented, that is based on the UNDP definition of human security. When correctly applied, this model is an early warning mechanism that can be used to prevent armed conflict rather than resolve it.

Intelligence models in today's PSOs

Most western military intelligence organization use combinations of analysis models that are described in U.S. Army doctrine when trying to create a comprehensive understanding of their operational environment. Most of these models are based on so-called “instruments of national power” that can be used to achieve “theatre, national and/or multinational objectives”¹³⁵. These intelligence models are defined by acronyms like DIME¹³⁶, DIMEFIL¹³⁷, ASCOPE¹³⁸ and PMESII¹³⁹. Today DIME and DIMEFIL are hardly used in PSOs.¹⁴⁰

The ASCOPE model is currently used in many PSOs and stabilization operations. For instance in Afghanistan this model was used by the British and Australian intelligence communities. The ASCOPE model analyzes the civil aspects¹⁴¹ of the AOI in terms of the following dimensions¹⁴²:

- Areas: analysis of the influence of key civilian areas on military operations and vice versa;

¹³⁵ Col. Jack D. Kem. “Understanding the Operational Environment: the Expansion of DIME” in *Military Intelligence* 33, no.2, April-June 2007, p.1

¹³⁶ Acronym for Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic

¹³⁷ Acronym for Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement

¹³⁸ Acronym for Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events

¹³⁹ Acronym for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure

¹⁴⁰ Personal conversation with LTC Martien Hagoort, staff officer at the Netherlands Military Intelligence School on 17 August 2011. LTC Hagoort explained that DIME and DIMEFIL are not being used on the operational and tactical levels of PSOs. The only models to be found today are ASCOPE and PMESII. Therefore the Netherlands Military Intelligence School does not train its students in models like DIME or DIMEFIL. Consequently these models are not discussed in this paper.

¹⁴¹ United States, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Handbook 10-41: Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, May 2010, p.6

¹⁴² Explanation of dimensions paraphrased from: Col. Jack D. Kem. “Understanding the Operational Environment: the Expansion of DIME” in *Military Intelligence* 33, no.2, April-June 2007, p.4

- **Structures:** analysis of physical infrastructure such as buildings, bridges, roads, railways, communication towers, in order to distinguish high pay-off targets, protected structures (such as monuments or important religious or cultural objects), or practically applicable objects (such as jails, power stations, television stations, warehouses). Also the presence of possible toxic materials is taken into account;
- **Capabilities:** analysis of the capabilities required and present in the AOI to save, sustain and enhance life e.g. public administration, food, emergency services, health care etc. In post combat operations, capabilities are often analyzed in the functional areas of public health, economy and commerce. Also capabilities that can be used in direct support of the mission such as local contractors for base construction, interpreters, laundry services, etc. are taken into account;
- **Organizations:** analysis of presence, activities and organizational composition of non-military groups and institutions in the AOI with respect to their influence on the populace, the military mission and vice versa. These organizations can be either local organizations as well as organizations from outside the AOI. The organizations can also be friendly or hostile to the intervention forces. Examples of these organizations are: local governance organizations, religious groups and organizations, IO's, NGO's, criminal organizations, labour unions, PSC's, etc.;
- **People:** analysis of non-military people in the AOI in terms of opinions, actions, political influence;
- **Events:** analysis of events in the AOI that affect the populace, the military operations, non-military organizations. These events can either be cyclic like religious and national holidays, agricultural events like crop harvest. They can also be planned, like elections. Events can be unplanned like civil unrest, environmental or natural disasters, industrial accidents. Event can also have a military character events like deployments, redeployments, combat etc.

In terms of human security, this model, when properly used, can cover the entire spectrum of the UNDP definition, although the dimensions of the ASCOPE model are not directly transferable to the

human security model in this paper. Food security for instance can be influenced by certain events or the presence/absence of certain capabilities. Perceived community security can be influenced by the protection of certain religiously important buildings or opinions and actions of certain groups of people.

With the current focus of the US Army Field Manual 3-0 on the PMESII model, this model has become a very important standard in today's PSOs and stabilization operations. In Afghanistan PMESII was for instance the intelligence standard for the U.S. and the Dutch forces.¹⁴³ The PMESII model is used to analyze the operational side of the AOI.¹⁴⁴ Dimensions in this model are:¹⁴⁵

- Political: analysis of political organizations, groups and individuals and their linkages within the AOI;
- Military: analysis of military organizations and their capabilities in the AOI;
- Economic: analysis of the economic position and health of groups in the AOI;
- Social: analysis of social networks within and between groups and social links of individuals;
- Information: analysis of the information position of a group in terms of the information known by the group, use of information within the group, propaganda, news media etc.;
- Infrastructure: analysis of the infrastructure within the AOI in terms of roads, railways, airports, power supply, sanitation, capabilities like governance organizations, etc.

Often the PMESII model is extended with dimensions like the physical environment, time, crime, narcotics or other dimensions, relevant to the specific mission. The uniqueness of the PMESII analysis is that the philosophy behind this model views the operational environment as a system of interacting subsystems. The operational environment for instance can be viewed as a system in which ethnic or religious groups act as separate interacting systems. These groups in turn are composed of tribes that

¹⁴³ Personal conversation with LTC Martien Hagoort, staff officer at the Netherlands Military Intelligence School on 17 August 2011. LTC Hagoort explained that PMESII is the only model that is being taught at the Netherlands Military Intelligence School. However he opposes to overreliance on a single intelligence model given the risk of tunnel vision. He therefore would like to see ASCOPE to return in the syllabus.

¹⁴⁴ United States, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Handbook 10-41: Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, May 2010, p.6

¹⁴⁵ Col. Jack D. Kem. "Understanding the Operational Environment: the Expansion of DIME" in *Military Intelligence* 33, no.2, April-June 2007, p.6

can be considered to be systems in their right. Terrorist groups are systems influencing these systems and so on. This philosophy, referred to as the so-called “system of systems approach”,¹⁴⁶ thus provides the intelligence community with a powerful instrument to analyze the current operations areas, where classical force on force engagements are no longer the standard.

In terms of human security, the PMESII model gives much information, however in its core UNDP dimensions like environmental, health and food security appear to be missing from the model. As with the other models discussed in this chapter, the applicability of the PMESII model for Human Security Intelligence depends heavily on the focus of the intelligence analysts who as stated before might choose to expand the model.

At the Military Operations Research Society Irregular Warfare Workshop, Col Daniel S. Roper, presented a model where ASCOPE and PMESII were crosscharted, thus creating an integrated operational overview of the Area of Operations in terms of the operation (PMESII) and the Civil environment (ASCOPE). The resulting model (filled in for Afghanistan) is depicted in Figure 8:

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

	P Political	M Military/Security	E Economic	S Social	I Infrastructure	I Information
A Areas	District / Provincial boundary	IED sites, military/ insurgent bases	Bazaars, farms, repair shops, bazaars	Picnic areas, bazaars, meeting sites	Irrigation networks, medical services	Radio, gathering points, graffiti, posters
S Structures	Shura halls, Court House	Police HQ's, military bases	Bazaars, banks, industrial plants	Mosques, Wedding halls	Roads, bridges, electrical lines, dams	Cell, radio and TV towers, print shops
C Capabilities	Dispute resolution, judges, local leadership	Military/Police Enemy recruiting potential?	Access to banks, development, black market	Traditional structures, means of justice	Ability to: build/maintain roads, dams, irrigation	Literacy rate, phone service
O Organizations	GOV & NGO organizations	Coalition & Host Nation Forces	Banks, landholders, economic NGO's	Tribes, clans, families	Gov Ministries, Construction companies	News organizations, mosques
P People	Governors, councils, elders, Judges	Coalition/ host nation military/ police leaders	Bankers, landholders, merchants, criminals	Religious/ civic leaders, elders, families	Builders, contractors, development councils	Civic/religious leaders, family heads
E Events	Elections, meetings, speeches, trials	Kinetic events, military/police operations	Drought, harvest, business opening	Weddings, deaths/births funerals, bazaar days	Road/bridge/school construction, well digging	Festivals, project openings

Figure 8: ASCOPE/PMESII crosswalk¹⁴⁷

Shortcomings of present intelligence models for Human Security Intelligence

The effectiveness of the aforementioned intelligence models for Human Security Intelligence is limited by a number of factors. These factors are related to these models, other factors are related to the application of these models.

To begin with, the presently used intelligence models focus on aspects in the AOI affecting the operation. These factors are very important to take into account in the planning process, however they are not linked directly to the desired end state and thus give limited information on the effectiveness of the operation.

¹⁴⁷ Col Daniel S. Roper. *Counter Insurgency Overview presented to MORS Irregular Warfare Workshop*, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, 19 April 2010, slide 24

Further, in his monograph “*Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*”, Maj Brian M. Ducote, discusses the PMESII-PT¹⁴⁸ model, however his findings apply to the DIME, DIMEFIL and ASCOPE models as well. Ducote contends that the PMESII-PT model is a model, used by commanders to “define smaller and independent aspects of an environment, classify the data into categories, explore relationships, and subsequently garner a greater understanding”.¹⁴⁹ This model is used as a linear model, meaning that the analysis is always conducted along the line starting with the political dimension and ending with the Infrastructure dimension.

The first factor is the fact that linear models limit the flexibility of the analysis, since linear models are constructed along a fixed set of dimensions. Ducote quotes Beckerman by stating that “linear models often tend to exhibit static variables in a static within static frameworks”.¹⁵⁰ This leads to the problem that the same model and variables within that very model are being used in different circumstances despite the difference in the very context in which the analysis takes place. The extension from the PMESII model with the dimensions of the Physical Environment and Time, shows that commanders sought to give meaning to the application of PMESII model by adding more context to the model.¹⁵¹ However this again led to a new static model.

The second factor lies in the usage of the models. US Army Field Manual 3-0¹⁵², in which the PMESII-PT model is presented as the de facto standard for intelligence analysis, does not always require intelligence analysts to link the various dimensions to contextual aspects of the environment in the AOI.¹⁵³ This linkage would create a holistic picture of the operational environment.

In his paper, Ducote however demonstrates that a true holistic analysis is based on narrative, rather than linear models, that do not enforce narrative by their construct. He defines narrative as a

¹⁴⁸ The extension PT stands for Physical Terrain and Time.

¹⁴⁹ Maj Brian M. Ducote. *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, 2010, p.12.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.10

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.7

¹⁵² US Army, *Field Manual 3-0: Operations*, Headquarters of the Army, Washington DC, February 2008, p.1-5

¹⁵³ Maj Brian M. Ducote. *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, 2010, p.20

descriptive explanation of the environment.¹⁵⁴ A holistic approach is not conducted by simple fact finding but also by placing these facts in their context, like culture, location or time. Ducote thus distinguishes information (dealing with the “what”), from knowledge (dealing with the “how”) and understanding (dealing with the “why”).¹⁵⁵

Where a linear model is often based on and too often ends with quantifiable data that is fed into the various dimensions¹⁵⁶, a holistic approach is much more an interpretation of facts. This interpretation can be influenced by the values and beliefs of the analyst.¹⁵⁷ A key factor influencing these values and beliefs is the cultural background of the analyst. It is therefore extremely important for an analyst to be able to know the culture in the AOI in order to interpret facts from that perspective. Montgomery McFate states that “misunderstanding culture at a strategic level can produce policies that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack of cultural knowledge¹⁵⁸ at an operational level can lead to negative public opinion and ignorance of the culture at a tactical level endangers both civilians and troops”.¹⁵⁹ An example of a result from the lack of cultural knowledge was given by the Arab journalist Zaki Chehab in an interview with Steve Inskeep on 1 December 2005:

“INSKEEP: Mistakes? You're talking about American troops that misbehave in the populace?”

Mr. CHEHAB: Yeah, because it's not matter of misbehaving. It's really the lack of knowledge, how-- the tradition in this area; how to deal with the elders; how, when you enter a house, you have to respect. In general, the inhabitants of that area are conservative Muslims. Doesn't mean they are extreme Muslim.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p.53

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.38

¹⁵⁶ Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

¹⁵⁷ Maj Brian M. Ducote. *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, 2010, p.39

¹⁵⁸ Although cultural could be considered to be part of the “Social” dimension of the PMESII(-PT) model, McFates argument states that cultural knowledge is often lacking. Therefore it can be concluded that culture is not sufficiently taken into account in the application of the PMESII(-PT) model.

¹⁵⁹ Montgomery McFate. “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture” in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 38, 3rd quarter 2005, p. 44

¹⁶⁰ <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5033882>; NPR, 1 December 2005.

Human Security Intelligence as a model

Intelligence efforts of today's PSOs are still focused on the aforementioned linear models that are focus on operational aspects. However, these instruments do not effectively address all dimensions determining human security in the UNDP sense and thus all the factors determining the effectiveness of the operation. As already depicted in Figure 7, there is a direct link between the various dimensions. Ignoring one or more dimensions of human security can lead to unforeseen risks for both the populace as well as the intervention forces.

Therefore a model must be developed in order to conduct an extensive analysis of the human security situation within the AOI of the intervention forces. The starting point of this model is the UNDP model given in Figure 1 of this paper.

The first question is whether this model should be designated by an acronym, like the other intelligence models, discussed in this paper. As shown above, intelligence models in today's PSOs are often used as a simple exercise of quantifiable fact finding to feed into different dimensions, while the links between the dimensions are ignored. This leads to information with limited value. Holistic approaches however do result in a richer understanding of the environment, although this understanding is an interpretation of the facts found in the analysis. Holistic models are not designated by acronyms, since they are constructed on ad hoc combinations of relevant dimensions. Given the fact that human security is a holistic construct, the temptation to create an acronym for a human security intelligence model is not desirable. Rather, the various UNDP dimensions should be analyzed in their relevant context to give true meaning to their variables. In Figure 9 an attempt is made to visualize the relationship between the UNDP model and the context in which the analysis takes place.




Figure 9: Human Security Intelligence Model¹⁶¹

The model shows that not only the variables within the different dimensions matter, but more importantly the causal relationships between the dimensions. Further, the aforementioned problem that analysts often do not take the context into account sufficiently, is addressed by making the context part of the model itself.

Given its multidimensional character, the model is a complicated one, creating a multidimensional picture that cannot be reproduced in a simple slideshow. The amount of variables influencing the various dimensions in this model is almost endless. On one hand, each UNDP dimension is influenced by variables in the context of the AOI. On the other hand, all dimensions are mutually related as well.

¹⁶¹ Self invented model

Therefore, the possible amount of causal pathways in this model is tremendous as well. This supports Ducote's conclusion that a true holistic analysis can only be conducted in the form of a narrative.¹⁶²

The value of this model lies in the fact that the model is directly related to the desired end state, and when properly applied, it gives valuable information regarding the effectiveness of the operation, as well as early warnings on possible conflicts to the commander of the intervention forces. In the comprehensive approach the commander can then address the root causes pro-actively rather than dealing with armed struggle in a responsive manner.

Since the Human Security Intelligence model is constructed around the UNDP model, it does however not provide for information regarding military aspects, legal aspects, the local police etc. Therefore the model should be used in combination with operational models like PMESII and ASCOPE.

The following chapter will address, technological developments in sensing and analysis systems and the application of this model in the Dutch Comprehensive Approach as described in Chapter 4.

¹⁶² Maj Brian M. Ducote. *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, 2010, p.53

CHAPTER 6 – HUMAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE IN PSOS

In the previous chapter a model for Human Security Intelligence was introduced. This chapter describes how this model can be applied in the context of PSOs, conducted by small armed forces like that of the Netherlands.

The process in which intelligence is being produced by most western countries is described in the so-called “intelligence cycle”. As the name of the process implies, the intelligence cycle is a continuous process that constantly repeats itself, given the continuous need for information for the operational and tactical planning processes as well as the continuous flow of collected information to be processed.

The intelligence cycle consists of four phases that are executed in every occurrence of the cycle. These phases are:

- Direction, in which the mission commander determines his intelligence requirements and the intelligence cycle is initiated;
- Collection, in which information is collected from the available sources;
- Processing, in which the collected data is collated, evaluated, analyzed, integrated and interpreted;
- Dissemination, in which the intelligence is distributed to people who need it.

A detailed description of the phases within the intelligence cycle can be found in both the Royal Netherlands Army Intelligence Guide LD5¹⁶³ and the CF Joint Intelligence Doctrine B-GJ-005-200/FP-000.¹⁶⁴ In this chapter the potential impact of the introduction of Human Security Intelligence in small armed forces will be described, following the steps of the intelligence cycle. The main focus will be on the constraints in each phase and how these constraints influence the success or failure of the entire intelligence effort. Given the limited financial resources of small armies like the Dutch, this analysis aims to help to identify where priorities for investments should be laid.

¹⁶³ Royal Netherlands Army. LD5 *Leidraad Inlichtingen* (Intelligence Guide), 2005, p.41

¹⁶⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005, p.15-2

In order to understand the rationale behind intelligence cycle, it is important to understand what is meant by data, information and intelligence. Data can be seen as the output of different collection items like sensors, radars, camera's, human beings etc. This data must be processed and where necessary translated into an workable format in order to create a current or historical picture of the state of affairs in the AOI. Intelligence is created by relating this information to already existing information, and subjective judgment in order to create an assessment of the mission environment and a prediction of the behavior of groups present in the mission environment.¹⁶⁵ Intelligence thus enables the commander and the CIVREP (defined in chapter 4) in their planning process to make better decisions in order to maximize their chance of success and minimize risks in the conduct of their operations.¹⁶⁶ The relationship between data, information and intelligence is given in Figure 10.




Figure 10: Data, Information and Intelligence¹⁶⁷

Figure 10 will be referenced to in the remainder of this chapter.

¹⁶⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003, p.1-3

¹⁶⁶ Royal Netherlands Army, *LD5 Leidraad Inlichtingen (Intelligence Guide)*, the Hague, 2005, p.54

¹⁶⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003, p.1-3

Direction

Direction is the first phase in the intelligence cycle. The NATO definition of direction is

*“Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies”.*¹⁶⁸

In the intelligence cycle direction is defined at both the level of the commander and the level of the intelligence officer.¹⁶⁹ The commander directs the process by formulating his Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs) and forwarding these along with required timelines to his intelligence staff. The intelligence officer directs the process by collecting all these CCIRs and other intelligence requests (for instance from flanking or higher units) and translating these requirements to collection requests to other units or tasking subordinate units for collection activities.

The Dutch description of the intelligence cycle distinguishes three relevant question types:

1. Questions related to expected actions of the adversary or other forces;
2. Questions related to the influence of the physical terrain and the weather conditions on the operation;
3. Questions related to the vulnerabilities of the adversary.¹⁷⁰

The Canadian description distinguishes the following question types:

1. Alert or Warning Indicators, related to preparations for aggression by the adversary;
2. Tactical or Combat Indicators, related to the type of operation to be conducted by the adversary;
3. Identification Indicators, related to the recognition of the identities and roles of units, formations or installations in relation to their organizations, equipment or tactics.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ NATO. AAP-6(2010) - *NATO Glossary of Terms And Definitions (English and French)*, p.2-I-6

¹⁶⁹ Royal Netherlands Army. *LD5 Leidraad Inlichtingen* (Intelligence Guide), 2006, p.43

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.44

¹⁷¹ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003, p.2-5

Given the question types in both descriptions of the intelligence cycle, it is fair to conclude that these descriptions are enemy-centric. Given the complexity of today's PSOs, commanders and CIVREPs already have many more questions than stated in above. As stated in the previous chapter, they expect PMESII-like analyses in order to understand how they can influence key leaders and groups within their AOR effectively.

When PSOs are conducted under the mandate of the Responsibility to Protect and with the intent to create a situation in which human security is guaranteed, it can be expected that from the start, commanders and CIVREPs will expect a Human Security Intelligence analysis of their AOI. The application of the Human Security Analysis model, that was proposed in the previous chapter, will only increase their information needs, leading to a significant increase in the amount of CCIR's to be sent to their intelligence staff. There is a real risk that this increase becomes overwhelming unless the CCIR's are simplified to what really is essential for the planning process.

Collection

Collection is the second phase in the intelligence cycle. NATO defines collection as: "*The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence*".¹⁷² Based on this definition, the conclusion is valid that the output of this phase consists of a mixture of data and information.

Given the enormous amounts of possible sources, the following collection disciplines or source types are distinguished:¹⁷³

1. ACINT (Acoustic Intelligence): detection and tracking of sound;
2. HUMINT (Human Intelligence): Information derived from human sources;
3. IMINT (Imagery Intelligence): Information in imagery form (photographic, infra-red, multi-spectral etc);

¹⁷² NATO. AAP-6(2010) - NATO Glossary of Terms And Definitions (English and French), p.2-I-6

¹⁷³ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003, p.2-15

4. MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence): Scientific and technical information to identify equipment used in the AOI;
5. OSINT (Open Source Intelligence): information available in the public domain like Internet, books, newspapers etc.;
6. RADINT (Radar Intelligence): information gathered by radar systems for instance to detect movement;
7. SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), which can be divided in COMINT (Communications Intelligence) for detection and tracking of communications from an individual or groups and ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) to detect and analyze electronic signals other than communications signals in the AOI.

In today's Peace Keeping Operations, intelligence units still make intensive use of technological collection assets as IMINT and COMINT for information gathering. As MGen Michael T. Flynn et al. put it: "Aerial drones and other collection assets are tasked with scanning the countryside in the hope of spotting insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes".¹⁷⁴ Although this remark relates to the intervention operation in Afghanistan, it also counts for some PSOs. Flynn distinguishes two levels of intelligence: higher-up intelligence shops (often National Intelligence and Security Services) and intelligence in the field (battalion and company levels). He contends that officers in the field acknowledge the need to balance collection from technical assets and population-centric information in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁵

Bernd Horn contends that HUMINT is one of the most important collection methods for intelligence, since it is the population from where extremely valuable information can be gathered regarding local societies and communities, cultural aspects. As Horn admits that HUMINT has its limitations as well,

¹⁷⁴ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.8

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

since HUMINT depends on people. “People [...] often decide to assist for a multitude of reasons”.¹⁷⁶

A major difficulty is to determine the reliability of human informants whether they are local civilians NGO’s or other civilian agencies in the area.¹⁷⁷ Certainly in areas where a proper administration on populace, police and justice records are largely absent, this is an almost impossible activity. Therefore a track record of human information sources should be maintained to provide statistical indicators regarding their reliability.

Flynn et al. compare information gathering in counterinsurgency with information gathering in conventional warfare. They state that in conventional warfare, ground units depend on information gathered by higher command. This intelligence can often be gathered with technical assets since it merely focuses on location, strength and activities of adversary forces. In counter insurgencies however, the most valuable information comes from the populace, with whom the soldiers on the ground interact. This means that according to Flynn et al. the information flow in counterinsurgencies should be reversed to that in conventional warfare.¹⁷⁸

The importance of HUMINT is further acknowledged by Kobi Michael and David Kellen. They acknowledge the importance of the local population as a key source of information as well,¹⁷⁹ given the fact that PSOs today are often confronted by non-state actors, like insurgents or terrorists who operate among the civilian populace.¹⁸⁰ Understanding the language, culture and the environment within the AOI is extremely important in order to make contact with the local populace in order to make it an effective source of information.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁶ Bernd Horn. “From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment”, Chapter 9 from *The Difficult War, Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Dr. Emily Spencer, Canadian Defence Academic Press, Kingston 2009, p.207

¹⁷⁷ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.7

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.8

¹⁷⁹ Kobi Michael, David Kellen. Cultural Intelligence for Peace Support Operations in the New Era of Warfare, Chapter 9 in *The Transformation of the World of War and Peace Support Operations*, ed. Kobi Michael, David Kellen, Eyal Ben-Ari, p.169

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.168

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.169

To address the complexities as well as the opportunities offered by the intensive interactions between the intervention forces and the local populace in modern PSOs, US ARMY Field Manual 3-21.75 introduces the concept of “Every soldier is a sensor”.¹⁸² This concept means that every soldier can be seen as a valuable asset in the process of critical information gathering since it is the soldier in the field who can observe what is happening and report this back in his line of command. The implementation of this concept requires training and a change of the soldiers’ mindset. For instance in Uruzgan, Dutch soldiers saw that an Afghan person was digging up a jerry can with unknown content in a graveyard. They reported this to their respective intelligence section, but failed to gather additional information, for instance by investigating what was in the jerry can, or by following the person in order to discover where he took it, thus missing valuable information of a possible supply line for Improvised Explosive Devices.¹⁸³

Open-source Intelligence is extremely important as well. LGen Samuel V. Wilson states that open sources account for ninety percent of information gathered.¹⁸⁴ Flynn et al. therefore warn that the “Cold War notion that open-source information is ‘second class’ is a dangerous, outmoded cliché”.¹⁸⁵ Certainly with the advent of the Internet, there has been a major proliferation of readily accessible information sources on crisis areas, conflicts, countries. Also many databases of indicators and indices on many aspects of human security have become available.¹⁸⁶ Given the speed in which the amount of open source information sources become available and the diversity of these information sources, the problem emerges that one could easily drown in the amounts of available information while on the other hand much information for direct operational purposes is lacking. A second problem here is that indicators and indices can be, and sometimes actually are, misused by for instance aid donors,

¹⁸² US Army, *Field Manual 3-21.75: The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills*, Headquarters of the Army, Washington DC, February 2008, p.9-1

¹⁸³ Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

¹⁸⁴ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.23

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Nada J. Pavlovic, Lisa Casagrande Hoshino, David R. Mandel, A. Walter Dorn. *Indicators and Indices of Conflict and Security: A Review and Classification of Open-Source Data*. Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto, September 2008, p.1

international investors and even analysts and academics.¹⁸⁷ For instance, aid donors sometimes exaggerate death tolls in armed conflicts in order to raise more money.¹⁸⁸ The *Human Security Report 2009/2010* published by the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, for instance mentions the excessive death toll estimate of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the period of 1998 to 2007. The report claims that this estimate was based on questionable methodology¹⁸⁹.

In order to maximize the utility of the ever increasing amounts of available information, an increasing amount of knowledge management is needed.¹⁹⁰ The search for information in the open-source domain thus should not only assist in finding open-sources, but also to classify their reliability and thus their applicability for intelligence purposes. Fortunately some agencies produce valuable overviews and classifications of valuable information sources, for example Defence Research and Development Canada produced a very good overview of open-source data sources in their report “*Indicators and Indices of Conflict and Security: A review and Classification of Open Source Data*”.¹⁹¹

Information to fill the various human security intelligence dimensions can be obtained from NGO’s, and IO’s and other organizations that already have been present in the AOI for longer periods prior to the beginning of the PSO. They often make this information available via databases over the internet. Also, as was the case in Uruzgan, there is an increasing willingness from these organizations to interact with the military via CIMIC channels. This again is a powerful HUMINT source.

Although this section strongly emphasizes the importance of HUMINT and OSINT, technological information collection assets continue to play an important role in modern PSOs. COMINT can for instance play an important role in corroboration of HUMINT information. IMINT can be used for a

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p.3

¹⁸⁸ Human Security Report Project. *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Cost of War*, Simon Fraser University, New York Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 126

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 124

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Nada J. Pavlovic, Lisa Casagrande Hoshino, David R. Mandel, A. Walter Dorn. *Indicators and Indices of Conflict and Security: A review and Classification of Open Source Data*, Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto, September 2008

wide variety of purposes, for instance for identification of key infrastructure, food production facilities, but also for more offensive tasks like gathering detailed information on the physical location of insurgents.

Technological assets are able to collect and produce large amounts of data and information in a short time, which in fact is a double edged sword. On one hand this ability can be seen as an advantage, since with relatively little human activity, large amounts of information become available. On the other hand, as will be shown in the next section, it might cause a major problem for intelligence analysts who have to analyze and correlate these large amounts of information.

The main limitation of technological information collection assets, however is the fact that they are not able to look into the mindset of the populace. Therefore the conclusion must be drawn that a proper balance between technological information collection and people centric information collection must be maintained in today's PSOs.

As stated in the previous section, the need for information will increase significantly when the intelligence focus moves towards human security as a whole. This will result in a significant increase in collection efforts, using both technological and non-technological collection assets.

Processing

Processing is the third phase in the intelligence cycle. NATO defines analysis as: "*The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation*".¹⁹² The output of this phase consists of answers to the CCIR's gathered in the direction phase, intelligence report, intelligence summaries and other intelligence products.

¹⁹² NATO. AAP-6(2010) - *NATO Glossary of Terms And Definitions (English and French)*, p.2-I-6

Processing of collected information on brigade level takes place in a Collation unit where collected information is stored in a database and an All Source Intelligence Cell (ASIC) where analysts work to analyze and integrate this information in order to produce a predictive assessment of the AOI, thus producing intelligence.

Within PSOs three key problems exist. The first problem is that at the battalion level and brigade level, intelligence cells are often staffed with insufficient numbers of analysts. According to Flynn et al. the consequence is that large amounts of information existing outside the traditional intelligence channels cannot properly be gathered, processed, analyzed and disseminated.¹⁹³

The second problem is the mismatch in information requirements and information provided between the various levels in the intelligence chain. Flynn et al. contend that often information from higher commands are of little use to the officers in the field, since they already know what is happening in the field and often were the very sources of the information they receive.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, higher command level intelligence officers are starved of information from the ground level, often disabling them of creating even rudimentary assessments of the AOI.¹⁹⁵

Although Flynn et al. focus on the US forces, their findings count for smaller forces like the Dutch even more. Arpad Palfy states that “multinational organizations have to operate in complex and often chaotic operational environment with frequently and therefore much less stable workforce than national intelligence organizations”.¹⁹⁶ In the Uruzgan situation, the ASIC consisted of a cell chief, one human factors analyst, two military analysts and two GEO analysts. The entire Dutch staff Task Force Uruzgan staff rotated every six months, leading to a loss of the capacity that was developed over the past period. Frequent rotations do mean that the organization must have sufficient skilled and experienced analysts to keep up with the rotation scheme. The situation in the Uruzgan province

¹⁹³ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.7

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p.8

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.9

¹⁹⁶ Arpad Palfy. *Intelligence Information Management in Joint Environments*, <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/IntelligenceInformationManagementPalfy> (accessed July 2011)

showed that qualified analysts were in short supply due to which gaps had to be filled with unqualified personnel.¹⁹⁷

The refusal of the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal Netherlands Navy to treat intelligence as a line of profession where people are educated and have their career paths can be seen as one of the root causes of this problem. Unlike other lines of profession, like medics, technology and maintenance and logistics where people can have an entire career, intelligence is considered to be a general military function where people only spend a part of their career, mostly three years after which they move to another function. Currently only the Royal Netherlands Air Force maintains intelligence as a line of profession.¹⁹⁸

The third problem identified by Flynn et al. is that analysts at brigade level are mainly kept focused on informing the brigade commander on developments in the AOR. Their time is therefore constantly consumed by creating maps showing insurgent networks, Powerpoint presentations on armed incidents, and digesting intelligence summaries from units in the field.¹⁹⁹ In the Task Force Uruzgan, this constant flow of incoming information contained also intelligence summaries from adjacent provinces, superior headquarters like Regional Command South and ISAF Headquarters in Kabul.

With the introduction of Human Security Intelligence in the operational environment, these problems are very likely to increase, given the fact that analysts will be confronted with much more information from even more dimensions than they were used to. Much of this information will come from the civil domain, but given the fact that this information constitutes to causal pathways in the military domain this information must be handled as equally relevant. The current intelligence capacity within the Dutch forces is however the limiting factor for the possibilities to conduct Human Security Intelligence effectively.

¹⁹⁷ Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

¹⁹⁸ Personal conversation with MGen (Ret'd) Pieter Cobelens, former chief of the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service on 7 August 2011

¹⁹⁹ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.7

According to Palfy, the key the problem lies in the absence of information management processes between the collection and analysis phases of the intelligence cycle. Often information management is seen as an IT problem and thus left to the IT staff to solve, while the entire intelligence staff is too busy to process and move the information to where it needs to be.²⁰⁰ During the first six rotations of the Task Force Uruzgan staff, there was no information management position²⁰¹ within the intelligence staff. There were no predefined information management processes, while all the incoming and produced information were stored in a folder structure on a network drive as unstructured and only partly searchable data and information. On top of this, in line with the description of Palfy, every rotation of the intelligence staff stored all the information of their predecessors in so-called backup folders and re-invented the entire information folders structure. This led to a situation where the intelligence staff of the seventh rotation of Task Force Uruzgan was confronted with a system where the information was buried in an unmanaged and unstructured information store consisting of over 42.000 folders that went up to 18 layers deep. Most information remained hidden in personal work folders. Despite the presence of a search engine on the archive folders, a large part of the information remained irretrievable.²⁰²

The information support system also contained a structured database (IBase) in which collators entered information distilled from the incoming information flow. However, just like analysts, qualified collators were in short supply and with every rotation the quality of the collators changed, resulting in a serious amount of data pollution, due to which again a vast amount of valuable information got lost.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Arpad Palfy. *Intelligence Information Management in Joint Environments*,

<http://www.vanguardcanada.com/IntelligenceInformationManagementPalfy> (accessed July 2011)

²⁰¹ In order to adopt information management as a topic in the curriculum of intelligence personnel, in 2010 a working group has been established at the Netherlands Military Intelligence School in which the author plays an advisory role.

²⁰² Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

²⁰³ Ibid.

In the Task Force Uruzgan situation, the Australian Army used a different organizational approach to collation and analysis. The intelligence cell within the mission area was a front office that consisted of only two or three officers, whose task was to collect the incoming information flow and relay it to an intelligence back office in Australia. This back office was a permanent collation and ASIC cell with staff serving longer than 6 months, thus gaining the necessary skills and experience for thorough analysis. In this back office the analysis took place and information was put into the Australian databases, after which the intelligence reports were returned to the Australian front office for further dissemination. This led to a situation in which the rotation of scarce and valuable personnel was no longer necessary. It ensured a constant workforce where lessons learned were directly fed into the organization, thus leading to constantly improving quality of work and intelligence output.²⁰⁴ This model could be equally beneficial for other small armed forces like the Dutch and Canadian as well. The downside of this solution is however the dependency on solid broadband satellite communication channels. According to the Australian Army, the benefits, although largely non-financial in character outweigh these costs.

Dissemination

Dissemination is the fourth and final phase within the intelligence cycle. NATO defines dissemination as *“The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it”*.²⁰⁵

According to Flynn et al. within the intelligence community a culture exists that is “emphatic about secrecy but regrettably less concerned about mission effectiveness.”²⁰⁶ Within permanent organizations like national defence forces and NATO, standard classification standards exist, like NATO CONFIDENTIAL, NATO SECRET, NATO UNCLAS etc. However since PSOs are often executed by so-called “coalitions of the willing” the composition of the coalitions vary per PSO. Countries thus

²⁰⁴ Personal conversations with the MRTF S2 and Australian liaison officers within the ASIC within the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

²⁰⁵ NATO. AAP-6(2010) - *NATO Glossary of Terms And Definitions (English and French)*, p.2-I-6

²⁰⁶ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.7

contribute to these coalitions while they are not part of a standing military structure like NATO or the Western European Union. Within these coalitions compartmentalization of information must be established by construing special classification standards. Within the ISAF operation classifications like ISAF SECRET , ISAF SECRET REL NATO, ISAF SECRET REL * EYES were invented. Information with the classification MISSION SECRET ISAF was allowed to be distributed to all contributing nations, while MISSION SECRET ISAF REL NATO allowed information only to be distributed among contributing nations that were member of NATO. The classification MISSION SECRET REL * EYES related to a specific compartment in which a number of countries were gathered. Only intelligence staffs from those countries had access to this information.²⁰⁷

The main problem with all these classifications is that there is little guidance on which classification to give to intelligence processes. This leads to the tendency in the intelligence community to play safe and give products a high classification by default, due to which valuable information does not reach everyone who needs it. According to Flynn et al. “currently, information [...] is inaccessible to people who need it most”. They speak of a needless failure that jeopardizes an entire operation while at the same time gives ground for international critique and even reason to ridicule the entire intelligence effort.²⁰⁸

Adam B. Siegel states that intelligence staff within PSOs has new “clients” for their products, like NGO’s, IO’s and local organizations working in the AOR. At the same time new products may have to be developed to support these clients.²⁰⁹ This results in challenges like how to deal with unclassified but sensitive information. However, here a cultural change is needed since within the intelligence community there is a reluctance among some officers towards discussing and sharing sensitive information with persons who in turn interact with outside organizations.²¹⁰ Flynn et al. agree with this

²⁰⁷ Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

²⁰⁸ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.20

²⁰⁹ Adam B. Siegel. “Information, Analysis, Intelligence: A Critical Challenge for 21st Century Operations”, Version published as “Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operation”, *Military Review*, September/October 2001, p.45-52

²¹⁰ Ibid.

vision by stating that analysts must disseminate their products with the “zeal of a journalist”,²¹¹ which according to them also means a cultural change.

Human Security Intelligence: Implications and opportunities

As mentioned in the previous chapters, in PSOs dedicated to the preservation and enhancement of human security, the mission leadership are likely to expect Human Security Intelligence analyses, which in turn will create an increase in information requirements to be laid upon the intelligence community. Such analyses could consist of assessments on developments regarding health risks, food supply or environmental assessments and their subsequent relations with conflicts in the AOI.

Many strategic think tanks believe that countries like the Netherlands should invest in intelligence collection capabilities, claiming that more gathered information will automatically lead to higher effectiveness of PSOs in their effort to enhance human security due to reduction of uncertainty and risk of intelligence failure. However, as Palfy states, this is an unrealistic assumption.²¹² Palfy quotes President Obama who after the December 2009 attempted bombing of a US airliner declared that the U.S. government had enough information to uncover this plot, but that the intelligence community failed to integrate and understand the available intelligence.

Following the analysis of the intelligence cycle in this chapter, it must be concluded that also in the case of PSOs the availability of operational information is not the key problem. The availability of Human Security Intelligence is still not abundant, however it is improving. CIMIC can play a powerful role to improve this. The main bottleneck in the intelligence cycle lies however in the processing phase where analysts drown in the flood of incoming information and therefore are unable to produce intelligence products to support their mission leadership in their decision making process. Therefore it must be concluded that just having more collection assets only increases the information

²¹¹ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.23

²¹² Arpad Palfy, *Intelligence Information Management in Joint Environments*, <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/IntelligenceInformationManagementPalfy> (accessed July 2011)

flowing to the already overloaded analysts, thereby only increasing the chances of intelligence failure. This does not mean that intelligence communities should close their eyes for technological developments from which smarter sensors evolve that for instance assist in filtering out relevant information or enable the collection of significant new information that would not be detected otherwise.

However the greatest risk of an intelligence failure resides in the analysis and dissemination phases of the intelligence cycle. These are the phases where the priority should be laid for further investments in the intelligence chain. This section gives some ideas how to deal with this bottleneck . These ideas take the developments in PSOs described in chapters 3 and 4 into account in terms of opportunities. On the other hand a feedback loop from the analysis phase to the collection and direction phases must be established as well, for instance to help in shifting priorities of information requests or collection priorities.

To start with the organizational side of the solution, Flynn et al. suggest that analysts should work along geographic lines, rather than functional lines. Each analyst would than cover one or more districts that they analyze comprehensively. Their analyses are laid down in narrative reports, not only describing the variables within the different dimensions, but also the causal pathways between them, thus connecting the dots.²¹³ This vision may count for operational intelligence, however in relation to Human Security Analysis there are two problems. First, analysts cannot be expected to expert in every field of Human Security Intelligence, which hampers the comprehensive analysis. Second, narrative reports are harder to scan than normal intelligence databases.

Flynn et al. contend that “the most obvious pool of qualified talent [...] are civilian analysts with the Defence Intelligence Agency and their NATO Allies”.²¹⁴ This means that also small forces like the Dutch or Canadian forces could contribute. Anthropologists could be augmented to add culture and

²¹³ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.18

²¹⁴ Ibid.

other insights to the analyses. The analysts would be stationed in a so-called Stability Operations Information Center in the mission area.²¹⁵ These centers would take much of the burden away from the units in the field by actively collecting, analyzing information from the field and disseminating it to a wide audience.

Possible organizational solutions on brigade level exist as well. For instance following the new Dutch Comprehensive Approach, the Mission Environment Cell consists of a military staff and, as stated in chapter 4 can be augmented with civilian staff, who have specific expertise that is normally not available within a military intelligence cell, such as economists, development specialists, medical specialists, environment specialists etc. Local and regional expertise might be added to this cell as well, provided they have a proven reliability. Otherwise this might be bridged by adding CIMIC personnel in the Mission Environment Cell, who in turn communicate with local and regional agencies and authorities. All these specialists may be drawn from a wide variety of sources such as governmental functions, academic institutions, NGO's etc. Siegel agrees with this vision and adds the idea to develop reservists with the requisite skills.²¹⁶ This would solve the problem that an intelligence analyst cannot grasp every specialism needed to judge all the variables throughout the Human Security Intelligence dimensions. Each dimension in the Human Security Intelligence model can be handled by analysts with the right expertise to make proper judgments. However this contradicts with the idea of Flynn et al. to divide the work along geographic lines instead of functional lines. It must be ensured that the causal pathways are analyzed and that the output of the process is a holistic narrative.

There are however two problems in this solution. The first problem is that many civilian specialists and organizations are very reluctant and often unwilling to contribute to intelligence cells since they feel that this could seriously damage their neutrality.²¹⁷ Flynn et al. however contend that this is a misplaced assumption. He states that intelligence should reach out to cooperate with the civilian

²¹⁵ Ibid., p.19

²¹⁶ Adam B. Siegel. "Information, Analysis, Intelligence: A Critical Challenge for 21st Century Operations", Version published as "Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operation" in *Military Review*, September/October 2001, p.45-52

²¹⁷ Ibid.

players.²¹⁸ Siegel suggests that intelligence personnel should actually act as “salesmen” to convince the specialists and organizations to cooperate closely with them. CIMIC can also play an important role to win civil organizations and individuals to cooperate, since CIMIC officers are used to interact with civilians. In the Netherlands this was proven since CIMIC reserve officers were able collect large quantities of valuable information for the new Police mentoring mission in the Afghan Kunduz province from Dutch offices of NGO’s that are already present in Kunduz. An important aspect here is to explain the difference between information and intelligence, where the cooperation is based on information sharing instead of delivering intelligence.²¹⁹

The second problem is the fact that some military information is classified, for instance information dealing with Special Operations Forces, and must be kept away from civilian organizations. This could be done by separating military and civil personnel physically, however that would again harm the information sharing process. It is therefore necessary to find a balance between information sharing and securing classified information. This delicate matter should be resolved on a case by case basis.

In order to prevent quality variance due to constant rotations in the mission area, the Mission Environment cell could be built as a front- back office solution, as described in the section on the analysis phase. As already stated this requires solid broad band satellite communication channels, which is quite expensive. However even for small armies, this solution might bring financial benefits as well, since this solution requires far less analysts then when they rotate in the mission area. Another benefit is that this solution requires less facilities to be built in the mission area as well as a reduction in personnel costs due to special mission appropriations that can be saved. This does not mean that there are no facilities whatsoever needed in the mission area. A front office is still needed as well some qualified intelligence personnel who guide the intelligence process in the mission area.

²¹⁸ USA MGen Michael T. Flynn, USMC Capt Matt Pottinger, DIA Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Society, January 2010, p.9

²¹⁹ Adam B. Siegel. “Information, Analysis, Intelligence: A Critical Challenge for 21st Century Operations”, Version published as “Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operation” in *Military Review*, September/October 2001, p.45-52

Another organizational solution could be to outsource specific intelligence tasks to so called Military Support Firms. These firms are a group within the sector of Private Security Companies. There are for instance Military Support Firms active in the field of intelligence.²²⁰ However, the drawback of these firms is that they work on a commercial basis and working with them requires solid contracts. In the situation of Task Force Uruzgan, a British Military Support Firm was hired by the Dutch government to operate some hired UAV's. It appeared that the contract provided for a fixed amount of flight hours. Additional flight hours were not provided for. Also the effectiveness of these flight hours was not discussed in the contract, which due to technical problems with these UAV's led to major expenditures for only a very limited effectiveness overall.²²¹ Apart from this, Military Support Firms who work in the intelligence field are not specialized in the freedom from want dimensions of Human Security Intelligence, since they are often staffed by retired military personnel with a very operational focus.

The second part of the solution for the analysis process on brigade level is the introduction of a proper knowledge management system in order to take the workload of reading all incoming information away from the analyst and prevent valuable information from getting lost.²²² Today there are IT systems on the market, dedicated to the intelligence community, that analyze incoming information in many different formats. They recognize patterns and generate alerts for analysts when they see a new pattern or a pattern that was predefined as suspect. The analysts just have to act on those alerts instead of going through the entire bulk of incoming information. These knowledge management systems also take care of proper information archiving. This prevents information from being lost and ensures that information can be retrieved any time.

With the adoption of Human Security Intelligence, the need for a knowledge management system can only expected to increase. Certainly given the fact that the process around Human Security

²²⁰ Humanitarian Policy Group. *HPG Research Report, Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, ed. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, HPG, London, March 2006, p.68

²²¹ Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

²²² Arpad Palfy, "Intelligence Information Management in Joint Environments", <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/IntelligenceInformationManagementPalfy> (accessed July 2011)

Intelligence can be expected to be a multi-agency effort due to which information flows will be much more complicated than in present military intelligence chains.

However without a proper information management process neither a new organizational approach nor an expensive knowledge management will work. According to Palfy information management is an often neglected or overlooked function, since “neither analysts nor collection managers/specialists want to be ‘information managers’ and therefore responsible for the tedious naming, storing, archiving, organizing, cross-referencing and retrieval of information”.²²³ Another factor why information management is often neglected is the assumption by many analysts that information management is about IT.²²⁴ Information management does however deal with what the term says: information. The information management process must address topics as who has access to which information, where information will be stored, naming conventions, who will put incoming information into the knowledge management system, who is allowed to change alert settings of the knowledge management system, how to deal with different levels of classification including defining when a product should have a certain classification level, how information flows through the entire intelligence process, etc. The impact of the concept of Human Security Intelligence will be that classification levels will go down to lower levels of confidentiality, given the fact that most information is already known by involved non-military organizations.

As already stated in the section on the dissemination phase, the civilian organizations in the mission area, should be seen as new “clients” for the products of the intelligence staff. As stated earlier, there is some reluctance within the intelligence community to share information with these organizations. However it should be borne in mind that these organizations will be more willing to cooperate with the intelligence cell when they can expect something in return, for instance security assessments or threat warnings, assessments on the fairness of election polls, or other kinds of information.²²⁵ This

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Personal observation in the position of Information Manager of the G2 branch within Task Force Uruzgan from August 2009 to February 2010

²²⁵ Adam B. Siegel: “Information, Analysis, Intelligence: A Critical Challenge for 21st Century Operations”, Version published as “Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operation” in *Military Review*, September/October 2001, p.45-52

also means that the introduction of Human Security Intelligence must result in a downgrade of many classification levels.

As PSOs as a whole are a multi agency matter, so too should the intelligence effort be, especially as it concerns Human Security Intelligence with all its non-military dimensions. Unity of effort between the involved agencies and intervention forces is a key success factor for today's PSOs, since stability depends heavily on the freedom from want side of the spectrum. Given the complexity of the environment in which today's and future PSOs take place, the intelligence community faces an enormous challenge, where close cooperation with other organizations in the mission environment is a major contributor and unity of effort is just as important as in other facets of the operation. Involving more partners in the intelligence process for instance, allows for more and better analysis of the situation in terms of human security.

An important development to be mentioned here is the Network Enabled Capability (NEC) concept that aims at increasing interoperability between the various organizations involved in PSOs. Given the subject of this paper, a brief explanation of this concept follows below. Detailed information can be found in the references.

The NEC concept is governed by the Command and Battlespace Management Programme of the British Ministry of Defence. Originally NEC aimed at interoperability in the military domain, however the model is valid for civil partners as well. In summary NEC is construed on three pillars: Networks, Information and People.²²⁶ In the NEC concept, organizations of units thereof are considered to be autonomous cells with their own specific tasks and their own ICT networks. Simply put, when these networks comply with NEC standards they can be connected in a "plug and play" fashion.

²²⁶ UK Ministry of Defence, JSP-777, *Network Enabled Capability*, UK Ministry of Defence, London, 2005, p.2-5

Human Security Intelligence can be a valuable driving factor for the further enhancement and proliferation of NEC, since NEC is designed to handle vast amounts of data. Involving more partners, both military and non-military allows for more funding of NEC.

Each organization has its own task in this environment and looks in this case at the human security situation from its own perspective. The organizations form a so-called “information value chain” in the intelligence production process. Information coordinators in this value chain must ensure that the right information is dispatched to the right person at the right time.

Given the fact however that each organization uses its own terms and language, an unambiguous translation layer must be present so that information provided to a “client” can be understood by that “client”.²²⁷ The British Ministry of Defence therefore developed the so-called “Corporate Business Modeling Language” (CBML) as an instrument to define the information requirements for the execution of a specific functionality within a workflow²²⁸. Based on an evolution of CBML, the InfoSpective methodology was developed by LincKen to create the translation layer.²²⁹

According to the NEC concept, people must be educated and trained to use and exploit the concept and contribute to its continuous improvement. This training is not only based on the concept itself, but also aims at building confidence between people across organizations that have to partner in the PSOs.²³⁰

²²⁷ UK Ministry of Defence, *Corporate Business Modelling Language (CBML)*, Baseline (Version 4.2), March 2010, p.1-1

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Personal conversation with Dr. Ken Allen on 20 July 2011. As a contractor for the UK Ministry of Defence, Dr. Ken Allen was one of the founders of CBML. He currently works for LincKen in Somerset (UK).

²³⁰ UK Ministry of Defence, JSP-777, *Network Enabled Capability*, UK Ministry of Defence, London, 2005, p.5

CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

The adoption by the UN of the Responsibility to Protect, will probably lead to an increase of UN mandated forceful interventions in humanitarian crises by coalitions of armed forces. The same forces are often involved in PSOs which today take place in environments with circumstances of similar complexity faced after the initial stages of intervention operations. In both types the human security situation will play an important role, which means that many more factors must be addressed than in traditional peacekeeping operations.

Leaders of PSOs base their decisions on their understanding of the mission environment. The increasing complexities of the mission environment, therefore lead to a major increase of intelligence requirements. As shown in this paper, the currently used intelligence models do not suffice to get a comprehensive common operational picture, since they primarily focus on operational aspects, and less on the effectiveness of the operation in terms of the desired end state. Human Security Intelligence is a holistic approach to map the human security situation by addressing the UNDP dimensions in relation with the context of the mission environment as well as an analysis of the causal pathways within the model.

The central question is how to deal with the increased intelligence requirements, especially in the case of small armed forces like the Dutch with their limited resources. Some strategic think tanks believe that countries like the Netherlands should invest heavily in intelligence collection assets, assuming that more information automatically leads to an enhancement of the human security situation. The analysis of the intelligence process in this paper however proves that this assumption is incorrect. As shown in this paper, the main bottleneck in the intelligence process is not the availability of information, but the capacity to process and analyze it. Analysts are already overloaded and providing them with even more information would even be counterproductive, since it leads to an increased risk of intelligence failure. Prioritizing which information to be collected and the information requests to address remains a key responsibility for analysts.

This paper concludes that the answer to provide high quality and actionable Human Security Intelligence must be sought in a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency intelligence effort, supported by proper technical means like a proper knowledge management system that is able to take routine matters away from analysts, enabling them to focus on alerts and specific information an patterns instead.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACINT	Acoustic Intelligence
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
AOI	Area of Interest
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASIC	All Source Intelligence Cell
CBML	Corporate Business Modelling Language
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIVREP	Civil Representative
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CULAD	Cultural Advisor
DEVAD	Development Advisor
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
GO	Governmental Organization
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IO	International Organization
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MRTF	Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force
NEC	Network Enabled Capability
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Private Security Company
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RADINT	Radar Intelligence
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TLO	The Liaison Office
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon
USMC	United States Marines Corps

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